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CITIZEN SCIENCE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
PUBLIC ACCESS TO MEDICAL BIG DATA 
Sharona Hoffman† 
ABSTRACT 
Patient-related medical information is becoming increasingly available on the 
Internet, spurred by government open data policies and private sector data sharing 
initiatives. Websites such as HealthData.gov, GenBank, and PatientsLikeMe allow 
members of the public to access a wealth of health information. As the medical 
information terrain quickly changes, the legal system must not lag behind. This Article 
provides a base on which to build a coherent health data policy. It canvasses emergent 
data troves and wrestles with their legal and ethical ramifications.  
Publicly accessible medical data have the potential to yield numerous benefits, 
including scientific discoveries, cost savings, new patient support tools, improved 
healthcare quality, greater government transparency, and public education. At the same 
time, the availability of electronic personal health information that can be mined by any 
Internet user raises concerns related to privacy, discrimination, erroneous research 
findings, and litigation. This Article analyzes the benefits and risks of health data sharing 
and proposes balanced legislative, regulatory, and policy modifications to guide data 
disclosure and use. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 9, 2013, President Barack Obama issued an executive order 
entitled “Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for 
Government Information.”1 The Order directed that, to the extent 
permitted by law, the government must release its data to the public in 
forms that are easy to find, access, and use.  
Health information drawn from patient records is among the most 
useful but sensitive types of data that are becoming commonly available to 
the public pursuant to President Obama’s policy and other public and 
private initiatives that will be discussed in this Article. This is the first 
article to canvass these emergent data troves and to wrestle with their legal 
and ethical ramifications. As federal agencies gear up to post increasing 
amounts of information on the Internet in order to comply with Executive 
Order 13,642,2 it is time to carefully consider the benefits and the risks of 
public access to medical data. The Article also formulates guidelines for 
data use in order to protect privacy, deter discrimination, and prevent 
other harms.  
Ordinary citizens can now easily find and access patient-related 
medical data on the Internet.3 This is the era of “Citizen Science” and 
“Do-It-Yourself Biology.”4 Citizen Science is “the practice of public 
participation and collaboration in scientific research” through data 
collection, monitoring, and analysis for purposes of scientific discovery, 
 
 1. Exec. Order No. 13,642, Making Open and Machine Readable the New 
Default for Government Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 28111 (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-05-14/pdf/2013-11533.pdf. The Order states, 
in relevant part: 
To promote continued job growth, Government efficiency, and the 
social good that can be gained from opening Government data to the 
public, the default state of new and modernized Government 
information resources shall be open and machine readable. 
Government information shall be managed as an asset throughout its 
life cycle to promote interoperability and openness, and, wherever 
possible and legally permissible, to ensure that data are released to the 
public in ways that make the data easy to find, accessible, and usable. 
 2. Id.; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY—MANAGING 
INFORMATION AS AN ASSET (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf.  
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. Heidi Ledford, Garage Biotech: Life Hackers, 467 SCIENCE 650, 650–52 (2010); 
Amy Dockser Marcus, Citizen Scientists, WALL STREET. J., Dec. 3, 2011.  
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usually without compensation.5 Do-It-Yourself Biology (DIYbio) is an 
international movement “spreading the use of biotechnology beyond 
traditional academics and industrial institutions and into the lay public.”6  
Large data resources are often called “big data,” which is characterized 
by its sizeable volume, variety, and velocity, that is, the speed with which it 
is produced.7 Increasingly, government and private sector sources furnish 
data collections to the public, and this supply stream will expand 
considerably in the future.8 In this Article, publicly available resources will 
be called “public-use data” or “open data.”  
The potential benefits of public access to health information are 
considerable. At a time of diminishing government funding for research,9 
the widespread availability of high-quality datasets at little to no cost may 
be very important to continued scientific advancement. Professional 
researchers as well as talented and dedicated students and amateurs could 
make important discoveries and answer pressing medical questions,10 and 
they could do so without undertaking the expense, time, and work 
involved in recruiting patients and developing original datasets.11 Open 
data has also enabled entrepreneurs to create tools that assist patients in 
navigating the complexities of the contemporary healthcare system by 
facilitating searches about symptoms and treatments, listing medical 
providers by location, and furnishing physician ratings and price 
information.12 In addition, federal and state data sharing initiatives 
promote government transparency and educational initiatives about health 
and medicine.13 Finally, data sharing may promote improvements in 
government-provided services. Easily accessible and navigable public-use 
 
 5. Citizen Science, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://education.nationalgeographic.com/
education/encyclopedia/citizen-science (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 
 6. DANIEL GRUSHKIN ET AL., SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT, SEVEN MYTHS 
& REALITIES ABOUT DO-IT-YOURSELF BIOLOGY 4 (2013), http://www.synbioproject
.org/process/assets/files/6676/7_myths_final.pdf.  




 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. Nora Macaluso, Decade-Long Funding Decline at NIH May Be Poised for Reversal, 
Collins Says, 13 BLOOMBERG BNA MED. RES. L. & POL’Y REP. 311 (2014) (indicating 
that “the chances of a project’s getting a grant from NIH have fallen to about 16 percent 
from 25 percent to 30 percent before 2003”). 
 10. See infra Section III.A. 
 11. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Section III.C. 
 13. See infra Section III.D. 
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data may help administrators determine how to allocate resources more 
effectively and engage in quality enhancement activities. Furthermore, 
media attention focused on healthcare inequities and inefficiencies may 
catalyze positive policy changes. 
At the same time, public access policies are not devoid of risks. First, 
the possibility of privacy breaches can never be fully eliminated.14 No 
matter how carefully data custodians de-identify patient information, at 
least a small risk of re-identification will always remain. If data holders do 
not thoroughly anonymize data, the risk of re-identification grows 
exponentially.15 Furthermore, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule does not cover most entities 
that operate public-use databases, and, therefore, those entities are not 
subject to detailed privacy regulations.16 Second, open data may enable 
discrimination by employers, financial institutions, and anyone with a 
stake in people’s health.17 These entities may attempt to re-identify 
publicly available health records that belong to applicants or to employees. 
In the alternative, they may mine medical data to find statistical 
associations between particular attributes, habits, or behaviors (for 
example, obesity or smoking) and health risks. Then, based on their 
findings, entities could formulate discriminatory policies that exclude from 
employment, financial, or other opportunities individuals they perceive as 
high-risk.18 Third, amateurs may reach incorrect conclusions and foster 
misconceptions among the public about human health or the healthcare 
industry. Amateurs could disseminate their findings broadly through the 
Internet without the filter mechanism of having articles reviewed and 
accepted by peer-reviewed journals.19 While some errors will be innocent, 
others might be intentional, with data manipulated to promote personal 
agendas, such as maligning certain ethnic groups, hurting business 
competitors, or supporting particular political viewpoints. In turn, parties 
who believe that they have been hurt by adverse research findings may 
initiate litigation, asserting claims such as defamation or interference with 
 
 14. See infra Section IV.A. 
 15. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and 
Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 105–107 
(2012) (discussing re-identification). For further discussion, see infra Sections IV.A.2, 
IV.A.3.b and IV.A.3.c. 
 16. See infra Section IV.A.3.a. 
 17. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 331, 334–35 (2007) (discussing the many parties who might be interested 
in obtaining medical information about individuals). 
 18. See infra Section IV.B. 
 19. See infra Section IV.C. 
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economic advantage.20 In some cases, parties will bring lawsuits merely to 
intimidate and harass citizen scientists and will needlessly burden the 
courts.21 
It is too early to tell whether the benefits of open data will outweigh 
the risks. However, it is noteworthy that the research projects 
contemplated in this Article will not be subject to the federal research 
regulations. The regulations exempt studies based on records or data that 
are publicly available, and they apply only to studies funded or conducted 
by federal agencies or submitted to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in support of applications for marketing approval.22 Citizen 
scientists will therefore operate in a regulatory vacuum with no governing 
standards or processes for approval and monitoring. This Article argues 
for the implementation of moderate safeguards and oversight mechanisms 
that will balance the needs of all stakeholders: patients, researchers, 
clinicians, industry, federal and state governmental entities, and the public 
at large.23  
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II will sample some of the 
many data collections that various government and private entities have 
already made publicly available, examining their content and any 
requirements for data use. Part III will analyze the benefits of public access 
to medical data, and Part IV will assess its risks. Part V will formulate a 
detailed proposal for legal and policy interventions designed to promote 
responsible health data stewardship and to protect those impacted by open 
data. The first set of recommendations addresses privacy concerns and 
includes changes to the HIPAA Privacy Rule; establishment of data 
release review boards; and requirements for data use agreements, privacy 
training, registries, and consent procedures. Other recommendations in 
Part V call for clarification and modest expansion of anti-discrimination 
protections; suggest the development of research guidance, peer review, 
and publication opportunities for citizen scientists; and address litigation 
and liability avoidance strategies pertaining to public-use data.  
 
 20. See infra Section IV.D. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2013) (stating that the regulations apply to “all 
research involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to 
regulation by any federal department or agency”); 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (describing the FDA 
regulations’ scope of coverage); 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2013) (exempting “[r]esearch 
involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological 
specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the 
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be 
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects”).  
 23. See infra Part V. 
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II. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE BIG DATA SOURCES 
Many large databases offer public access to patient-related health 
information. Federal and state governments as well as private sector 
enterprises have established these databases. No comprehensive catalogue 
of these sources exists. This Part lists a representative sample of databases 
that feature public-use medical data.  
A. FEDERAL AND STATE DATABASES 
1. Federal Government Data at HealthData.gov 
HealthData.gov, launched in 2011, is a Department of Health and 
Human Services website that makes over 1000 data sets available to 
researchers, entrepreneurs, and the public free of charge.24 It predates 
Executive Order 13,642 by two years and establishes a home for the 
federal government’s open data. Several states and federal government 
agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Administration for Children and 
Families provide the data sets.25  
All users can search for information by key words, agency type, and 
subject area.26 As just one example, users can access a table entitled 
“Vaccination coverage among children 19–35 months of age for selected 
diseases, by race, Hispanic origin, poverty level, and location of residence 
in metropolitan statistical area.”27 HealthData.gov offers many interactive 
analysis tools and will continue to grow and be refined over the coming 
years.28 Users can access a number of separate federal agency databases 
 
 24. About, HEALTHDATA.GOV, www.healthdata.gov/content/about (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015). 
 25.  Id. 
 26. HEALTHDATA.GOV, http://healthdata.gov (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). The 
subject areas listed are administrative, biomedical research, children’s health, 
epidemiology, healthcare cost, healthcare providers, Medicaid, Medicare, population 
statistics, quality measurement, safety, treatments, and other. 
 27. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vaccination Coverage Among Children 
19–35 Months of Age for Selected Diseases, HEALTHDATA.GOV (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://www.healthdata.gov/dataset/selected-trend-table-health-united-states-2011-
vaccination-coverage-among-children-19–35.  
 28. See, e.g., Harnam Singh, The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) Introduces 
Interactive Data Analysis Applications, HEALTHDATA.GOV (May 29, 2014), 
http://healthdata.gov/blog/national-practitioner-data-bank-npdb-introduces-interactive
-data-analysis-applications; Damon Davis et al., Health Data Initiative Strategy & 
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through Healthdata.gov. The CDC database, CDC Wonder,29 and the 
CMS database, Chronic Condition Data Warehouse,30 are discussed 
below. 
a) CDC Wonder 
CDC Wonder enables researchers and the public at large to access a 
wide variety of public health information.31 This includes data sets about 
deaths, births, cancer, HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, vaccinations, census 
data, and more.32 The website features statistical research data, reference 
material, reports, and guidelines related to public health.33 Users conduct 
queries by selecting items from drop-down menus and completing fill-in-
the-blank forms.34 Prior to receiving data, users must read a short “data 
use restrictions” screen and click “I agree,” thereby promising to comply 
with instructions concerning data use and disclosure that are designed to 
protect the privacy of data subjects.35 
b) Chronic Condition Data Warehouse  
The CMS established the Chronic Condition Data Warehouse 
(CCW) to allow users to purchase data about Medicare and Medicaid 
beneficiaries and claims.36 Researchers can apply for access to identifiable 
or partially identifiable data, and CCW administrators scrutinize all 
requests.37 CCW also offers public-use files that contain aggregated 
summary level health information for which no data use agreement or 
 
 29. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Wonder: Births, 
HEALTHDATA.GOV (Oct. 30, 2015), http://healthdata.gov/dataset/cdc-wonder-births-0.  
 30. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Chronic Condition Data Warehouse, 
HEALTHDATA.GOV (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.healthdata.gov/dataset/chronic
-condition-data-warehouse. 
 31. What Is CDC Wonder?, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/help/
main.html#What is WONDER (last updated Jan. 25, 2016).  
 32.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., About Natality, 2007–2013, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/
natality-current.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). See infra note 309 and accompanying 
text for further discussion of data use agreements. 
 36. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, CHRONIC CONDITIONS 
DATA WAREHOUSE, https://www.ccwdata.org/web/guest/home (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015). 
 37. CMS Data Request Center, RESEARCH DATA ASSISTANCE CENTER, 
http://www.resdac.org/cms-data/request/cms-data-request-center (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015). 
  
1750 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:3  
privacy board review is required.38 For example, the Medicaid State Drug 
Utilization File contains information about outpatient drugs for which 
state Medicaid agencies have paid.39 
2. State Government Health Data Websites 
Like the federal government, many states offer publicly available 
health data on government websites. Examples are Health Data New 
York,40 New Jersey State Health Assessment Data,41 North Carolina State 
Center for Health Statistics,42 FloridaHealthFinder.gov,43 and Minnesota 
Center for Health Statistics.44 All these websites provide a wealth of 
information free of charge to the public and offer a variety of interactive 
tools and query options. 
3. Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) is sponsored by 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality45 and offers a variety of 
databases for purchase. These include the following:  
 Nationwide Inpatient Sample  
 Kids’ Inpatient Database 
 Nationwide Emergency Department Sample  
 State Inpatient Databases 
 State Ambulatory Surgery Databases 
 State Emergency Department Databases46  
 
 38. Public Use Files (PUF)/Non-Identifiable Data Requests, RESEARCH DATA 
ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://www.resdac.org/cms-data/request/public-use-files (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015).  
 39. Medicaid State Drug Utilization File, RESEARCH DATA ASSISTANCE CENTER, 
http://resdac.advantagelabs.com/cms-data/files/medicaid-state-drug-utilization (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015).  
 40. Health Data NY, N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://health.data.ny.gov (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 41. NJSHAD: New Jersey’s Public Health Data Resource, N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://www26.state.nj.us/doh-shad/home/Welcome.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
 42. Statistics and Reports, N.C. STATE CEN. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
http://www.schs.state.nc.us/data/minority.cfm (last updated Jan. 5, 2016).  
 43. State Health Data Directory, FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., 
http://www.floridahealthfinder.gov/StateHealthDataDirectory (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 44. Selected Public Health Data Websites, MINN. CENTER FOR HEALTH STAT., 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/chs/countytables/resources.htm (last updated Jan. 21, 
2016). 
 45. Overview of HCUP, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT, 
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/overview.jsp (last updated Jan. 28, 2016).  
 46. Id. 
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HCUP databases offer “a core set of clinical and nonclinical 
information found in a typical [hospital] discharge abstract including all-
listed diagnoses and procedures, discharge status, patient demographics, 
and charges for all patients, regardless of payer (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, 
private insurance, uninsured).”47 Patient demographics may include sex, 
age, and—for some states—race, but no other attributes that more directly 
identify patients.48 The databases are available for purchase, and 
purchasers must complete a training course and sign a data use agreement 
prior to receiving data.49 Users must agree to use the data solely for 
research and statistical purposes and not to attempt to identify any 
individual.50 Those wishing to purchase information from state databases 
must also explain how they intend to use the data.51 Prices may vary 
significantly, depending on the type of data sought and the type of entity 
with which the applicant is affiliated (for example, for-profit or non-profit 
organization), with significant discounts available to students.52 
4. GenBank 
GenBank is the National Institutes of Health’s genetic sequence 
database, which includes all DNA sequences that are publicly available.53 
The data are free, and GenBank places no restriction on their use.54 
According to scientists at the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, GenBank contains “over 900 complete genomes, including 
the draft human genome, and some 95,000 species.”55 Leading journals 
 
 47. Databases and Related Tools from HCUP: Fact Sheet, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/
factsheets/tools/hcupdata/datahcup.html (last updated Mar. 2011).  
 48. Overview of the State Inpatient Databases, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION 
PROJECT, http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/sidoverview.jsp (last updated Jan. 20, 2016).  
 49. Purchase HCUP Data, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT, 
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/tech_assist/centdist.jsp (last updated Nov. 18, 2015).  
 50. HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT, HCUP NATIONWIDE 
INPATIENT SAMPLE APPLICATION (2015), http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/db/nation/nis/
NISApp_Final.pdf.  
 51. Purchase HCUP Data, supra note 49. 
 52. HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT, SID/SASD/SEDD 
APPLICATION KIT (2015), http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/db/state/SIDSASDSEDD
_Final.pdf (listing prices that range from $35 to over $1600). 
 53. GenBank Overview, NAT’L CEN. FOR BIOTECH. INFO. (NCBI), http://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jo McEntyre & David J. Lipman, GenBank—A Model Community Resource?, 
NATURE (Apr. 5, 2001), http://www.nature.com/nature/debates/e-access/Articles/
lipman.html. 
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now require authors to deposit their sequences in GenBank, and all 
publicly funded laboratories also do so as a matter of policy.56 
GenBank provides a variety of data search and retrieval tools, such as 
the Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST), which finds similarities 
between sequences.57 Public-use data available on GenBank have enabled 
scientists and commercial enterprises to conduct research and generate 
new products, including assemblies of the human genome produced by 
Celera Genomics and the University of California at Santa Cruz.58 
5. All-Payer Claims Databases 
A large number of states have launched all-payer claims databases that 
collect information about private and public insurance related to medical, 
dental, and pharmacy services.59 Typically, the collected data include 
information regarding patient demographics; insurance contracts; 
healthcare providers; payments made by insurers and patients; dates on 
which medical services were received; and codes for diagnoses, procedures, 
and drugs.60 Consumers, employers, and other stakeholders can access data 
to learn about healthcare costs, compare prices, and make more informed 
decisions about insurance plans and healthcare providers.61  
Similarly, CMS has released Medicare provider utilization and 
payment data that is available free of charge.62 The website offers 
information pertaining to the 100 most commonly performed inpatient 
services, thirty frequently provided outpatient services, and more.63 Thus, 
for instance, users may obtain hospital-specific charges for particular 
services and compare prices.64 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.; Genbank Overview, supra note 53.  
 58. McEntyre & Lipman, supra note 55. 
 59. JO PORTER ET AL., THE BASICS OF ALL-PAYER CLAIMS DATABASES: A 
PRIMER FOR STATES 1 (2014), http://www.apcdcouncil.org/sites/apcdcouncil.org/files/
The%20Basics%20of%20All-Payer%20Claims%20Databases.pdf.  
 60. Id. at 2. 
 61. Id. at 3; Colorado Medical Price Compare, CTR. FOR IMPROVING VALUE IN 
HEALTH CARE, https://www.cohealthdata.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2015); CHIA Data, 
CTR. FOR HEALTH INFO. & ANALYSIS, http://www.chiamass.gov/chia-data (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015) (requiring applications for Massachusetts data).  
 62. Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics
-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data (last updated Apr. 30, 2015). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Inpatient, CTRS. FOR 
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B. PRIVATE SECTOR DATABASES 
1. Dryad Digital Repository 
Dryad is an international repository containing data files associated 
with peer-reviewed scientific articles and other “reputable sources (such as 
dissertations).”65 It is a nonprofit organization supported by fees from its 
members and data submitters.66 Researchers submit data underlying their 
publications directly to Dryad, and any member of the public can access 
the collection at no cost.67 The website provides a search tool that allows 
users to enter key words or other search criteria and takes them to data 
associated with particular publications.68 
2. PatientsLikeMe 
PatientsLikeMe is a for-profit website that enables patients who sign 
up for membership to share their health data and disease experiences.69 
Users can report and obtain information about treatments and connect 
with others who have the same condition.70 PatientsLikeMe acknowledges 
that it sells de-identified information submitted by users to its “partners,” 
which it describes as “companies that can use that data to improve or 
understand products or the disease market.”71 Members may choose 
different privacy settings and may determine whether non-members will 
 
(last updated June 1, 2015). But see Patrick T. O’Gara, Caution Advised: Medicare’s 
Physician-Payment Data Release, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (2014) (discussing the 
limitations of payment data released by CMS); Dawn Fallik, For Big Data, Big Questions 
Remain, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1111, 1111 (2014) (stating that “Medicare’s release of 
practitioner payments highlights the strengths and weaknesses of digging into big data”). 
 65. The Organization: Overview, DRYAD, http://datadryad.org/pages/organization 
(last updated Oct. 22, 2015); Frequently Asked Questions, DRYAD, http://datadryad.org/
pages/faq#depositing (last updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
 66. Pricing Plans and Data Publishing Prices, DRYAD, http://datadryad.org/pages/
pricing (last updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
 67. Frequently Asked Questions, DRYAD, http://datadryad.org/pages/faq#using (last 
updated Jan. 5, 2016). 
 68. The Repository: Key Features, DRYAD, http://datadryad.org/pages/repository (last 
updated Feb. 15, 2015).  
 69. PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.com (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015). 
 70. What Is PatientsLikeMe?, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://support.patientslikeme
.com/hc/en-us/articles/201186434-What-is-PatientsLikeMe- (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015). 
 71. Does PatientsLikeMe Sell My Data?, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://support
.patientslikeme.com/hc/en-us/articles/201245770-Does-PatientsLikeMe-sell-my
-information- (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).  
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be able to view any of their data.72 PatientsLikeMe releases reports of 
aggregated data concerning symptoms and treatments to the public.73 In 
addition, members may opt into a public registry that will make their 
profiles and shared data available to anyone with access to the Internet.74 
PatientsLikeMe makes public-use information available on its website at 
no cost and does not require applications or data use agreements.75 
3. The Personal Genome Project 
George Church launched the Personal Genome Project in 2005 at 
Harvard University, and it is now an international enterprise involving 
thousands of patients.76 It aims to promote research and offers genomic, 
environmental, and human trait information from volunteer participants 
to any interested party.77 Users can easily access a wealth of information 
directly from the website, including genome data, genome reports, trait 
and survey data, participant profiles, and microbiome data.78 Data files list 
the date of birth, gender, zip code, height, weight, and race of individual 
participants, though names are not displayed.79 The Personal Genome 
Project states explicitly that its participants must be “willing to waive 
expectations of privacy” in order to make “a valuable and lasting 
contribution to science.”80 
 
 72. Privacy Policy, PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.com/about/
privacy (last updated Mar. 5, 2012).  
 73. See, e.g., Treatments, PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.com/
treatments (last updated Feb. 2, 2016). 
 74. See, e.g., Welcome to the PatientsLikeMe Public ALS Registry, PATIENTSLIKEME, 
http://www.patientslikeme.com/registry (last visited Nov. 23, 2015); What Information is 
Visible on Public Profiles?, PATIENTSLIKEME, https://support.patientslikeme.com/hc/en-
us/articles/201245830-What-information-is-visible-on-public-profiles- (last visited Nov. 
23, 2015). 
 75. Conditions at PatientsLikeMe, PATIENTSLIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme
.com/conditions (last updated Feb. 5, 2016).  
 76. About PGP Harvard, PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, HARV. MED. SCH., 
http://www.personalgenomes.org/harvard/about-pgp (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; Data & Samples, PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, HARV. MED. SCH., 
http://www.personalgenomes.org/harvard/data (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (Microbiome 
data focuses on “the types of bacteria in and on a participant’s body.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Public Genetic Data, PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, HARV. MED. 
SCH., https://my.pgp-hms.org/public_genetic_data (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 80. About PGP Harvard, supra note 76.  
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III. THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
Public-use data potentially offer many valuable benefits. These include 
new scientific discoveries, research cost savings, new tools to help patients 
navigate the healthcare system, greater government transparency, public 
education about science and medicine, improved healthcare quality, and 
positive healthcare policy changes. 
A. SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
One of the great hopes of health data sharing is that it will promote 
scientific discovery and medical advances. Citizen scientists may be 
extremely motivated and dedicated researchers, perhaps especially if they 
are focusing on diseases that afflict them or their loved ones. Citizen 
scientists who would not otherwise have access to health data and lack the 
means to collect original data for studies may nevertheless have the skills, 
talent, and creativity to make significant contributions given the 
appropriate data tools.81  
In his May 2013 executive order, President Obama stated that public 
information resources have enabled entrepreneurs and innovators “to 
develop a vast range of useful new products and businesses.”82 Similarly, 
proponents of DIYbio enthuse that it “can inspire a generation of 
bioengineers to discover new medicines, customize crops to feed the 
world’s exploding population, harness microbes to sequester carbon, solve 
the energy crisis, or even grow our next building materials.”83  
Citizen scientists have proven themselves to be capable inventors 
whose contributions aid many people. For example, three Dutch DIY 
biologists created Amplino, an inexpensive diagnostic system that can be 
used in developing countries to detect malaria with a single drop of blood 
in less than forty minutes.84 Likewise, Katherine Aull, a graduate of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology whose father suffered from 
 
 81. Huseyin Naci & John P. A. Ioannidis, Evaluation of Wellness Determinants and 
Interventions by Citizen Scientists, 314 JAMA 121, 122 (2015), http://jama.jamanetwork
.com/article.aspx?articleid=2330497. 
 82. Exec. Order No. 13,642, supra note 1. 
 83. Grushkin et al., supra note 6, at 4. 
 84. Thomas Landrain et al., Do-It-Yourself Biology: Challenges and Promises for an 
Open Science and Technology Movement, 7 SYST. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 115, 121 (2013); 
Linda Nordling, DIY Biotech: How to Build Yourself a Low-Cost Malaria Detector, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development
-professionals-network/2014/apr/25/diy-detector-malaria-eradication-amplino (reporting 
that Amplino “is almost ready for field-testing in rural Zambia”).  
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hemochromatosis, a condition that causes the body to absorb excessive 
amounts of iron and can permanently damage vital organs, developed a 
homemade genetic test to determine whether she was vulnerable to this 
inherited disease.85 She built a lab in her closet and used equipment 
purchased from eBay or found in her kitchen.86 
New troves of publicly available data promise to facilitate and 
accelerate the work of professional researchers and citizen scientists. Public 
data sources have already led to important discoveries. For example, 
Project Tycho is a University of Pittsburgh initiative designed to promote 
the availability and use of public health data by facilitating its analysis and 
redistribution.87 Tycho researchers have digitized disease surveillance data 
from the years 1888 to 2011 published in the CDC’s Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report and estimate that since 1924, 103 million 
incidents of childhood diseases were prevented because of 
immunizations.88 This finding will be useful for public health authorities, 
who at times meet resistance to vaccination efforts. 
Among the more creative initiatives was a crowdsourcing contest 
called the Dialogue on Reverse Engineering Assessment and Methods 
(DREAM7) focused on breast cancer prognosis.89 Crowdsourcing can be 
defined as “a participative online activity in which an individual, an 
institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a group of 
individuals . . . via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a 
task.”90 DREAM7 provided participants with access to genetic and clinical 
data from Sage’s Synapse, an informatics platform that allows users to 
 
 85. Ana Delgado, DIYbio: Making Things and Making Futures, 48 FUTURES 65, 70 
(2013); Biopunks Tinker with the Building Blocks of Life, NPR (May 19, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/22/136464041/biopunks-tinker-with-the-building-blocks
-of-life.  
 86. Delgado, supra note 85, at 70. 
 87. About Project Tycho Data, U. OF PITTSBURGH, https://www.tycho.pitt.edu/
about.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 88. Willem G. van Panhuis et al., Contagious Diseases in the United States from 1888 
to the Present, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2152, 2156 (2013). 
 89. Michael Eisenstein, Crowdsourced Contest Identifies Best-In-Class Breast Cancer 
Prognostic, 7 NATURE BIOTECH. 578, 578 (2013). 
 90. Enrique Estellés-Arolas & Fernando González-Ladrón-de-Guevara, Towards 
an Integrated Crowdsourcing Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 189, 197 (2012); see also Thea C 
Norman et al., Leveraging Crowdsourcing to Facilitate the Discovery of New Medicines, 3 
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. mr1, 2 (2011) (defining crowdsourcing as “the act of 
outsourcing tasks traditionally performed by an employee to an undefined, large group of 
people or community (a ‘crowd’)”). 
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share data and access programming codes and analytical tools.91 The 
contest challenged the crowd to “provide an unbiased assessment of 
models and methodologies for the prediction of breast cancer survival.”92 A 
winner was selected from among 1400 entries, and results were published 
in a scientific journal.93 
Crowdsourcing is an increasingly popular phenomenon.94 It has been 
used for projects ranging from locating over 1400 automated external 
defibrillators in public places in Philadelphia to developing a predictive 
algorithm for regions of local similarity between genetic sequences that is 
superior to the NIH’s standard algorithm, BLAST.95 The availability of 
vast amounts of publicly accessible data may make crowdsourcing all the 
more prevalent. Researchers will likely continue to harness the talents and 
expertise of citizen scientists to make important contributions to medical 
science.96  
B. RESEARCH COST REDUCTIONS 
Open data resources will be of particular value in an era of diminished 
research funding. NIH appropriations peaked at $36.4 billion in fiscal year 
2010 thanks to funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, but they declined to $29.9 billion by fiscal year 2014. In 2014, the 
NIH funded 18.1% of grant proposals compared to 31.5% in 2000.97 
At the same time, despite the abundance of information and medical 
technology available in the twenty-first century, “more than half of 
medical treatments are used without sufficient proof of their 
 
 91. SYNAPSE, ABOUT SYNAPSE (2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.synapse
.org/About_Synapse.pdf.  
 92. GUSTAVO STOLOVITZSKY & ANDREA CALIFANO, DREAM CHALLENGE 
(2013), http://www.slideshare.net/tulipnandu/dream-challenge.  
 93. Eisenstein, supra note 89, at 578. 
 94. Benjamin M. Good & Andrew I. Su, Crowdsourcing for Bioinformatics, 29 
BIOINFORMATICS 1925, 1925 (2013). 
 95. The Accelerating World of Drug Discovery and Commercialization, TRENDS MAG., 
Oct. 2013, at 30 (2013); Basic Local Assignment Search Tool (BLAST), NAT’L CENTER 
FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 96. Benjamin L. Raynard et al., Crowdsourcing—Harnessing the Masses to Advance 
Health and Medicine, A Systematic Review, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 187, 187 (2014) 
(concluding that “[u]tilizing crowdsourcing can improve the quality, cost, and speed of a 
research project while engaging large segments of the public and creating novel science”).  
 97.  Research Project Success Rates by NIH Institute for 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.report.nih.gov/success_rates/Success_ByIC.cfm (last 
updated Mar. 22, 2012). 
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effectiveness.”98 For example, experts have recently raised new questions 
about the efficacy of mammography, a well-established practice that was 
long considered life-saving and a key element of preventive medicine.99 
Likewise, although physicians have prescribed and studied hormone 
replacement therapy for post-menopausal women for decades, experts are 
still unsure as to whether it is advisable or whether its risks outweigh its 
benefits, at least for some subgroups of patients.100 A third illustration is a 
debate over the risks of a particular class of antidepressants called selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) in light of evidence that they may 
induce suicidal thoughts and behavior in adolescent patients.101 No 
consensus has formed regarding this side effect, and further study is 
necessary.102 
Professional researchers and citizen scientists will be able to use open 
data to reduce the expense of clinical trials and to conduct low-cost 
records-based research. While many will focus on well-known and 
widespread health problems, open data may also stimulate the study of 
subjects for which little to no public funding is available. For example, 
because of vigorous lobbying by the National Rifle Association, the CDC 
was prohibited for many years from analyzing the impact of firearms on 
public health.103 Similarly, there is often limited interest in or funding for 
research relating to rare diseases.104 Citizen scientists, however, may be 
highly motivated, for personal rather than profit-seeking reasons, to 
research those diseases. 
 
 98. Eric B. Larson, Building Trust in the Power of “Big Data” Research to Serve the 
Public Good, 309 JAMA 2443, 2444 (2013). 
 99. Nikola Biller-Andorno & Peter Jüni, Abolishing Mammography Screening 
Programs? A View from the Swiss Medical Board, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1965, 1965–67 
(2014). 
 100. HERBERT I. WEISBERG, BIAS AND CAUSATION: MODELS AND JUDGMENT 
FOR VALID COMPARISONS 18–21 (2010) (noting that the risks may include slight 
elevations in the incidence of coronary heart disease and breast cancer). 
 101. Id. at 21–23. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Michael Luo, Sway of N.R.A. Blocks Studies, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/26guns.html. The moratorium was lifted 
by a memorandum issued by President Obama in January of 2013. Memorandum, 
Engaging in Public Health Research on the Causes and Prevention of Gun Violence, 78 
Fed. Reg. 4295 (Jan. 16, 2013). 
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The gold standard of medical research has traditionally been 
randomized, controlled clinical trials.105 Phase 3 clinical trials, conducted 
as the final step before approval of a drug, cost an average of $20 million, 
involve 300 to 3000 people, and last one to four years.106 These 
experimental studies are conducted through “the collection of data on a 
process when there is some manipulation of variables that are assumed to 
affect the outcome of a process, keeping other variables constant as far as 
possible.”107 Thus, investigators might design a clinical trial to compare 
two drugs for a particular ailment or to compare a drug to a placebo. If 
researchers share data from prior clinical trials, they may be able to 
improve study quality and efficiency by honing in on patient sub-groups 
that are most likely to be responsive to the drug in question.108 For 
example, a bladder cancer study determined that one participant who 
responded unusually well to the drug everolimus had a particular genetic 
mutation, and thus future testing of the drug could focus on subjects with 
that mutation to determine whether it enhances responsiveness to the 
drug.109 
In the alternative, researchers can undertake observational studies by 
reviewing existing records and data sets rather than conducting 
experiments.110 Professional researchers and citizen scientists will be able 
to use the large quantities of open data that are now becoming available to 
 
 105. Friedrich K. Port, Role of Observational Studies Versus Clinical Trials in ESRD 
Research, 57 KIDNEY INT’L (SUPPLEMENT 74) S3, S3 (2000), http://www.kidney
-international.org/article/S0085-2538(15)47033-4/pdf (stating that “[r]andomized 
controlled clinical trials have been considered by many to be the only reliable source for 
information in health services research”); see also Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in 
Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 452–54 
(2001) (describing different clinical trial designs). 
 106. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, EXAMINATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL 
COSTS AND BARRIERS FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT (2014), http://aspe.hhs.gov/report/
examination-clinical-trial-costs-and-barriers-drug-development; Step 3: Clinical Research, 
U.S. FDA, (2015), http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm. 
These sources also discuss the earlier stages of clinical trials, Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
 107. BRYAN F.J. MANLY, THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH STUDIES 1 
(1992). 
 108. Eisenstein, supra note 89, at 580. 
 109. Id.; Gopa Iyer et al., Genome Sequencing Identifies a Basis for Everolimus 
Sensitivity, 338 SCIENCE 221, 221 (2012). 
 110. Observational studies involve the review of existing records or data. See 
CHARLES P. FRIEDMAN & JEREMY C. WYATT, EVALUATION METHODS IN 
BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 369 (Kathryn J. Hannah & Marion J. Ball eds., 2nd ed. 
2006) (defining observational studies as involving an “[a]pproach to study design that 
entails no experimental manipulation”). 
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minimize research expenses. Researchers may find that existing data 
collections contain all the raw data that they need and be spared the work 
and cost of recruiting human subjects for original data. Public-use data can 
thus prevent costly duplication of effort.111 
Furthermore, an emerging trend called crowdfunding can fund 
relatively inexpensive big data projects.112 Crowdfunding is an Internet-
based method of fundraising by which one can solicit money from 
numerous donors, who usually contribute small amounts.113 Typically, 
crowdfunding for scientific projects raises less than $10,000,114 but 
enterprising fund-raisers have frequently surpassed that sum.115 Public-use 
data may enable a growing number of projects to have very limited costs 
that researchers can cover creatively rather than through the traditional 
channels of government-allocated grant awards.  
 
 111. CDC, CDC-GA-2005-14, CDC/ATSDR POLICY ON RELEASING AND 
SHARING DATA 5–6 (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/maso/Policy/ReleasingData.pdf. 
 112. Vural Özdemir et al., Crowd-Funded Micro-Grants for Genomics and “Big Data”: 
An Actionable Idea Connecting Small (Artisan) Science, Infrastructure Science, and Citizen 
Philanthropy, 17 OMICS 161, 162 (2013).  
 113. Stuart R. Cohn, New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad 
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2012). 
 114. Rachel E. Wheat et al., Raising Money for Scientific Research Through 
Crowdfunding, 28 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 71, 72 (2013), http://jarrettbyrnes
.info/pdfs/Wheat_et_al_2012.pdf.  
 115. Ethan O. Perlstein, Anatomy of the Crowd4Discovery Crowdfunding Campaign, 2 
SPRINGERPLUS 560, 561 (2013), http://www.springerplus.com/content/pdf/2193-1801-2
-560.pdf (reporting that the authors raised $25,460 from 390 donors in 15 countries for a 
pharmacological research project); Joe Palca, Scientists Get Research Donations from Crowd 
Funding, NPR (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171975368/scientist
-gets-research-donations-from-crowdfunding (reporting that UBiome and American 
Gut together raised over $600,000 for projects designed to discover how microbiomes 
(tiny organisms that reside in the human body) influence health when donors were 
promised an analysis of the bacteria in their own digestive tracts). The Internet offers a 
large number of platforms for crowdfunding, including the aptly named Kickstarter, 
Experiment, and Indiegogo, among others. See KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter
.com; EXPERIMENT, https://experiment.com; INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com. 
Crowdfunding has become so popular that it is being used not only by enterprising 
individuals and companies but also by several universities, such as the University of 
Virginia and Tulane, that are seeking to compensate for the dearth of funding from 
traditional sources. Morgan Estabrook, New Crowdfunding Site Allows Public to Advance 
U. Va. Research Projects Through Targeted Donations, UVA TODAY (May 15, 2013), 
http://news.virginia.edu/content/new-crowdfunding-site-allows-public-advance-uva
-research-projects-through-targeted-donations; Keith Brannon, Tulane University Launches 
Crowdfunding Partnership for Medical Research, TULANE U. (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://tulane.edu/news/releases/pr_12102013.cfm. To enhance their likelihood of success 
and attract donors, those pursuing crowdfunding are well-advised to post convincing 
videos on funding websites and to follow up with blog entries and media coverage of their 
projects, to the extent possible. Perlstein, supra, at 561. 
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C. TOOLS TO HELP PATIENTS NAVIGATE THE HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM 
Open health data can promote not only research but also services that 
are helpful for patients. Several enterprises are developing tools to help 
patients obtain suitable and affordable medical care. Aidin is a small 
startup that uses CMS data on health facilities and nursing homes to 
provide hospitals and patients with information about options for care 
after discharge from the hospital.116 Aidin offers its clients listings of 
available providers, quality of care ratings, and reviews. It also helps 
hospitals track patient experiences and outcomes so that they can 
determine which providers are the best fit for patients with specific health 
conditions.117 
Similarly, iTriage is a free mobile app and website that allows patients 
to look up their symptoms and learn about possible causes and 
treatments.118 In addition, it assists patients in locating and selecting 
appropriate care options by providing a variety of information, including 
hospital wait times and physician ratings.119 iTriage uses publicly available 
data from HHS, the FDA, and other sources.120 
Other examples are the state all-payer claims databases, Medicare’s 
Provider Utilization and Payment Data, and Medicare’s Hospital 
Compare.121 These educate patients about healthcare costs and quality and 
allow patients to compare prices for various inpatient and outpatient 
services.122 
D. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Proponents of government transparency will be pleased by the 
proliferation of open data. Databases such as HealthData.gov, Genbank, 
and others123 allow viewers to gain significant insight into the information 
that the government has collected about individuals and the healthcare 
 
 116. Former Sec. Sebelius Celebrates Aidin in Annual “Health Datapalooza” Speech, 
AIDIN (June 12, 2014), http://www.myaidin.com/articles/june_2014/002.html; Our 
Story, AIDIN, http://www.myaidin.com/ourstory.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 117. Our Story, AIDIN, supra note 116. 
 118. What is iTriage?, ITRIAGE, https://about.itriagehealth.com/itriage-what-is (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 119. Id. 
 120. About Our Medical Content, ITRIAGE, https://about.itriagehealth.com/company
-info/medical-content (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 121. See supra Section II.A.5; Hospital Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www
.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 122. See Hospital Compare, supra note 121. 
 123. See supra Part II. 
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industry. In some cases, such insight may generate public debate and 
critique of government investigative policies that could lead to positive 
policy changes.124 
In addition, public-use data can function as an important educational 
tool.125 Patients can research their own conditions, find doctors with 
special expertise, better prepare for their medical appointments, and assess 
different treatment options that they are given.126 Furthermore, the general 
public can learn about the healthcare system, healthcare costs, disease 
trends, genetics, research and public health initiatives, and much more.127 
Ordinary citizens and students will be able to access raw data themselves 
and engage in research exercises, either within the framework of academic 
programs or on their own. For example, the New York University School 
of Medicine is leveraging open data resources to enhance its curriculum. It 
is creating patient snapshots from New York hospital discharge data and 
developing sophisticated training tools based on these cases.128 Active 
learning and engagement with health data might also inspire greater 
public enthusiasm about medical research and more vocal support for 
government funding of this vital activity. 
E. IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTHCARE QUALITY AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH POLICY 
Open data can fuel improvements in healthcare quality and health 
policies. A report from New York State provided a number of compelling 
illustrations.129 In 2011, in preparation for Hurricane Irene, nursing home 
administrators used publicly available weekly bed census reports to identify 
facilities to which they could evacuate residents.130 Likewise, annual 
 
 124. CDC/ATSDR POLICY ON RELEASING AND SHARING DATA, supra note 111, 
at 4 (stating that data sharing can “build trust with outside partners and the public by 
allowing open critique of CDC investigations”). 
 125. GRUSHKIN, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that “wider access to the tools of 
biotechnology, particularly those related to the reading and writing of DNA, has the 
potential to spur global innovation and promote biology education and literacy”). 
 126. Internet searches, however, should not replace consultation with medical 
experts, and often have pitfalls. Patients should not panic based on their independent 
research and become convinced that they suffer from a dreaded disease or have a poor 
prognosis before being examined by a physician. Patients also should not go to the doctor 
with a closed mind, unwilling to accept the expert’s own assessment and treatment 
recommendations. 
 127. See supra Part II. 
 128. Erika G. Martin et al., Liberating Data to Transform Healthcare: New York’s Open 
Data Experience, 311 JAMA 2481, 2481 (2014). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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reports of cardiac surgery mortality rates, linked to the hospitals and 
surgeons who provide care, induced low-scoring facilities to undertake 
quality improvement initiatives and several physicians who performed 
poorly to leave practice.131 A different study, published in 2015 in Health 
Affairs, concluded that Medicare’s Hospital Compare “slowed the rate of 
price increases in a majority of states that had not previously been exposed 
to comparable information through their own public reporting systems.”132 
Once data are released, they are available not only to the general 
public, but also to the media. Media stories about health-related inequities 
can be particularly potent tools to effect policy changes. After officials 
released New York childhood obesity statistics that were organized by 
school district, news outlets highlighted the disparities in 2013 and some 
school administrators decided to improve their policies despite cost 
concerns.133 A 2014 report in Crain’s New York Business that publicized 
hospital cost disparities (for example, hip replacements that cost $103,725 
at New York University Hospitals Center but only $15,436 at Bellevue 
Hospital Center) is likewise expected to catalyze pricing and 
reimbursement changes.134 
IV. RISKS OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO HEALTH DATA 
Although the benefits of opening health data resources to the public 
are considerable, the risks are not inconsequential. The federal research 
regulations cover only studies that are funded or conducted by federal 
government agencies or that do not use publicly available data.135 
Therefore, studies without federal funding and ones that use publicly 
available data are not subject to any formal oversight. Furthermore, the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule and state privacy laws most likely will not govern 
open databases.136 This Part analyzes several potential risks associated with 
open access to patient-related health information: 1) privacy breaches; 2) 
discrimination and special targeting by employers, financial institutions, 
and marketers, among others; 3) propagation of incorrect and harmful 
research conclusions; and 4) litigation. 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Avi Dor et al., Medicare’s Hospital Compare Quality Reports Appear to Have 
Slowed Price Increases for Two Major Procedures, 34 HEALTH AFF. 71, 75 (2015) (focusing 
on coronary artery bypass grafts and percutaneous coronary interventions). 
 133. Martin et al., supra note 128, at 2481. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(a), 46.101(b)(4) (2013).  
 136. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
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A. PRIVACY THREATS 
I recently logged onto the Personal Genome Project and looked at the 
Participant Profiles section.137 To my surprise, several profiles disclosed 
the names of patients along with their date of birth, sex, weight, height, 
blood type, race, health conditions, medications, allergies, procedures, and 
more.138 I wondered if these patients understood that anyone with a 
computer could view all of this information. Other profiles excluded the 
name of the participant but provided all of the other details, which could 
potentially allow a clever and motivated viewer to identify the patient. 
Privacy threats are the first risk that may come to mind with respect to 
public use of patient-related medical big data. The HIPAA Privacy 
Rule,139 the Privacy Act,140 and numerous state privacy laws govern the 
disclosure of medical records.141 However, the laws and regulations do not 
cover all data holders who make medical information publicly available.142 
In addition, public-use data is most often presented in de-identified 
form143 and thus is exempt from the disclosure restrictions established in 
these laws and regulations.144 Moreover, even with thorough de-
identification, at least a small risk of re-identification remains. Privacy 
concerns thus deserve thorough analysis. 
1. Privacy Law 
Many federal and state laws address medical privacy. None of the laws, 
however, provide patients with comprehensive protection, and even in the 
aggregate, they leave many gaps. The following discussion describes laws 
and regulations relevant to the disclosure of patient-related data for public 
use. 
 
 137. Participant Profiles, PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, HARV. MED. SCH., 
https://my.pgp-hms.org/users (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 138. Public Profile -- hu43860C, PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, HARV. MED. SCH., 
https://my.pgp-hms.org/profile/hu43860C (last updated Sept. 4, 2015). 
 139. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–.534 (2013). 
 140. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2010). 
 141. See AMERICANS HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, STATE HEALTHCARE 
PRIVACY LAW SURVEY (2013); Sarah Hexem, Public Health Departments and State 
Patient Confidentiality Laws Map, LAWATLAS, http://lawatlas.org/preview?dataset
=public-health-departments-and-state-patient-confidentiality-laws (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015). 
 142. See infra Sections IV.A.1 and IV.A.3.a. 
 143. See supra Part II. 
 144. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
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a) The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes that, with some exceptions, 
entities covered by the regulations must obtain patients’ permission before 
disclosing their medical information to third parties.145 The Rule, 
however, covers only health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, healthcare 
providers who transmit health information electronically for purposes of 
HIPAA-relevant transactions, and their business associates.146 It does not 
apply to government agencies or private enterprises that are not acting in 
these capacities. Thus, HIPAA does not regulate many of the websites 
discussed in Part II of this Article, such as those operated by state 
governments, CDC, Dryad or PatientsLikeMe. 
Moreover, the HIPAA Privacy Rule protects only “individually 
identifiable health information” that is electronically or otherwise 
transmitted or maintained.147 Consequently, the federal regulations do not 
govern data that custodians de-identify148 and open to the public. 
b) The Privacy Act 
The Privacy Act is a federal law that governs the collection, storage, 
use, and disclosure of information by the federal government.149 The law 
provides that the federal government may not disclose records without the 
data subject’s permission, unless specific exceptions apply. However, the 
Privacy Act defines the term “record” as an item that contains a person’s 
“name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular 
assigned to the individual.”150 Consequently, the Privacy Act exempts the 
government’s dissemination of de-identified information on 
HealthData.gov or other websites. 
c) State Laws 
All states have recognized a common law or statutory right to 
privacy151 and have statutes that address privacy concerns.152 A thorough 
 
 145. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508–.510 (2013). 
 146. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–.103 (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 17934 (2010). 
 147. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). 
 148. See infra Section IV.A.2 (discussing HIPAA’s requirements for de-
identification). 
 149. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2010). 
 150. Id. at § 552a(a)(4). 
 151. See Corrine Parver, Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part Two: Personalized Medicine 
and the Legal Landscape, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 32 (2009). 
 152. See AMERICANS HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 141; 
LAWATLAS, supra note 141.  
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analysis of state law is beyond the scope of this Article.153 In general, state 
laws are varied and inconsistent, often providing piecemeal protection for 
some types of data but not others.154 Moreover, like the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule and the Privacy Act, states typically allow disclosure of de-identified 
health information without patient authorization.155 Therefore, most of 
the public-use data resources contemplated in this Article would not be 
governed by state law. 
2. De-identif ication 
The foregoing discussion raises the following critical question: what 
does “de-identified” mean, and how can data holders achieve de-
identification? The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides a detailed answer. It 
states that health information is de-identified if (1) a qualified expert 
determines that there is only a “very small” risk that the data can be re-
identified, and (2) the expert documents his or her analysis.156 The 
Department of Health and Human Services issued guidance that endorsed 
several de-identification techniques: 
 Suppression, which involves redaction of particular data 
features prior to disclosure (e.g., removing zip codes, 
birthdates, income); 
 Generalization, which involves transforming particular 
information into less specific representations (e.g., 
indicating a 10-year age range instead of exact age); and  
 Perturbation, which involves exchanging certain data 
values for equally specific but different values (e.g., 
changing patients’ ages).157 
 
 153. For detailed information about state privacy and confidentiality laws, see 
AMERICANS HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 141; LAWATLAS, supra 
note 141. 
 154. See Deven McGraw et al., Privacy as an Enabler, Not an Impediment: Building 
Trust into Health Information Exchange, 28 HEALTH AFF. 416, 420 (2009) (noting that 
“[a]lthough the states have an important role to play in privacy policy, state privacy laws 
are fragmentary and inconsistent, providing neither developers nor consumers with the 
assurances they deserve, especially for services of nationwide reach”). 
 155. Scott Burris et al., The Role of State Law in Protecting Human Subjects of Public 
Health Research and Practice, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 656 (2003).  
 156. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2013). 
 157. Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information 
in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy 
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In the alternative, according to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, de-
identification is achieved if the following eighteen identifiers are removed: 
(A) Names;  
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including 
street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their 
equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a 
zip code if, according to the current publicly available data 
from the Bureau of the Census:  
(1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip 
codes with the same three initial digits contains more 
than 20,000 people; and  
(2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such 
geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer people is 
changed to 000; 
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related 
to an individual, including birth date, admission date, 
discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89 and all 
elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, 
except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into 
a single category of age 90 or older;  
(D) Telephone numbers;  
(E) Fax numbers;  
(F) Electronic mail addresses;  
(G) Social security numbers;  
(H) Medical record numbers;  
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers;  
(J) Account numbers;  
(K) Certificate/license numbers;  
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license 
plate numbers;  
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;  
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);  
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;  
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;  
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; 
and  
 
#guidancedetermination (noting that techniques such as suppression and generalization 
are often used in combination).  
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(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or 
code . . . .158 
Health information that has all eighteen identifiers removed in 
accordance with the HIPAA “safe harbor” provision is considered per se 
de-identified and exempted from HIPAA coverage unless a covered entity 
knows that the data can be used on its own or together with other 
information to identify a data subject.159 For example, if researchers 
request only data pertaining to a very small geographic area in which most 
people know each other, it may be impossible to truly de-identify the 
information.160 In such a case, experts may need to aggregate data from 
several locations or to combine suppression with other techniques. 
3. Does Public-Use Medical Data Pose a Real Privacy Threat? 
Data custodians offering public-use data may try hard to de-identify 
patient records or to ask for patients’ consent to disclosure.161 Nevertheless, 
many are not required to do so because they are not covered by the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule and its data disclosure and de-identification 
guidelines. Consequently, the patient authorization and de-identification 
practices that data custodians choose to implement may deviate from 
HIPAA standards and leave data more vulnerable to attack by hackers or 
other wrongdoers. 
Moreover, even with careful de-identification, sophisticated 
adversaries may be able to re-identify at least a small number of records. 
Successful de-identification of genetic information may be particularly 
challenging. With voluminous de-identified medical data available to the 
public, re-identification attempts are likely to occur. Perpetrators may have 
malevolent intent, such as identity theft, or may simply be interested in 
determining whether they can meet the challenge of re-identification.  
a) Data Holders Not Covered by the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s health information disclosure and de-
identification requirements do not apply to most suppliers of publicly 
available health data, because they are either government agencies or non-
 
 158. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2013). Removal of the eighteen identifiers is a 
comprehensive form of suppression. 
 159. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii) (2013). 
 160. Khaled El Emam et al., Evaluating Predictors of Geographic Area Population Size 
Cut-offs to Manage Re-identification Risk, 16 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 256, 
256–57 (2009); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1117, 1156 (2013). 
 161. See supra Part II. 
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covered private entities.162 Consequently, these data holders may not be 
diligent about obtaining meaningful patient authorization for disclosure of 
identifiable information. In addition, if they de-identify records, they may 
choose to do so in ways that provide far less privacy protection to their 
subjects than does the HIPAA safe harbor provision. Stripping medical 
records of names alone does little to conceal patients’ identities, and even 
leaving just a few specific details may make it easy to ascertain who the 
individual is. One startling study found that almost 98% of Montreal 
residents could be identified based on their full postal code, date of birth, 
and gender.163 
Data holders’ de-identification practices vary. A 2013 survey found 
that thirty-three states released patient hospital discharge data to the 
public, but only seven de-identified them in a manner that would conform 
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s standard.164 Many states released the month 
or quarter of hospital admission and/or discharge and patients’ five-digit 
zip codes.165 Datasets with these details are more vulnerable to re-
identification than those that are de-identified in accordance with HIPAA 
guidance. The more personal details a publicly available health record 
contains, the more likely it is to be matched to other open datasets that 
include names, such as voter registration lists, purchasing records,166 or 
news reports.167 Thus, the more overlapping information fields there are 
between the medical records and other datasets, such as zip codes, ages, 
and details of illness, the more likely an adversary will be able to link 
names to the purportedly anonymized health information. 
Scholars confirm that concern about re-identification is well-
grounded, as demonstrated by a variety of re-identification successes. In a 
particularly infamous case, Latanya Sweeney, now a computer scientist at 
Harvard University, identified the health records of Massachusetts’ 
Governor William Weld when she was a graduate student at the 
 
 162. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 163. Khaled El Emam, The Re-identification Risk of Canadians from Longitudinal 
Demographics, 11 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 46, 51 (2011). 
 164. SEAN HOOLEY & LATANYA SWEENEY, SURVEY OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 
STATE HEALTH DATABASES 4 (2013), http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/50states/
1075-1.pdf. 
 165. Id. at 4–7. 
 166. See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing information that third 
parties can purchase about individuals). 
 167. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and Security: Myths and Fallacies 
of “Personally Identifiable Information,” COMM. ACM, June 2010, at 24, 26; Re-
identification, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/
reidentification (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1996.168 She compared birth 
date, gender, and zip code information that was retained in publicly 
released hospital discharge records to the same identifiers in publicly 
available voter registration lists and could match voter names to hospital 
records.169  
In a more recent effort, Dr. Sweeney and colleagues worked to re-
identify publicly available profiles in the Personal Genome Project170 that 
contained medical and genomic information as well as date of birth, 
gender, and zip code.171 They linked the demographic data to voter lists or 
other public records that featured names and were able to identify eighty-
four to ninety-seven percent of Personal Genome Project profiles.172 
In a third project, Dr. Sweeney focused on Washington State hospital 
discharge data, which contained many demographic details other than 
names and addresses and could be purchased for fifty dollars. She 
attempted to match hospitalization records to eighty-one newspaper 
stories about accidents and injuries in 2011 and was able to determine the 
name of the patient to whom the records belonged in thirty-five (or forty-
three percent) of the cases, based on the news accounts.173 
b) Re-identification of Fully De-identified Health Records 
Theoretically, de-identification in accordance with the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule’s guidelines should make it impossible for anyone to 
determine the identity of data subjects. Nevertheless, experts have 
concluded that there remains a small risk that highly skilled and motivated 
attackers will be able to re-identify records that have been de-identified in 
 
 168. Jonathan Shaw, Exposed: The Erosion of Privacy in the Internet Era, HARV. 
MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 38, http://harvardmagazine.com/2009/09/privacy-erosion-in
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 169. Id.; Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-identification Risks with 
Respect to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 17 J. AM MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 169, 169 (2010). 
 170. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 171. Latanya Sweeney et al., Identifying Participants in the Personal Genome Project 
by Name (Harv. U. Data Privacy Lab, White Paper 1021‐1, Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/pgp/1021-1.pdf. 
 172. Id. at 1. The researchers found that some Personal Genome Project profiles 
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State Data (Harv. U. Data Privacy Lab, White Paper 1089-1, July 4, 2013), 
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compliance with HIPAA guidelines.174 Re-identification may occur when 
perpetrators have access to non-medical open data, such as voter 
registration records, that they can link to anonymized health information. 
Studies have estimated that the risk of re-identification of HIPAA de-
identified records falls in the range of 0.01% to 0.25%.175 Although this 
percentage seems tiny, it translates into a risk of tens of thousands or even 
hundreds of thousands of records being re-identified if one thinks in terms 
of the 323 million individuals in the American population.176 
Furthermore, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s safe harbor provision does 
not ban the disclosure of certain details whose presence could make it 
easier to identify individuals. For example, according to Dr. Khaled El 
Emam, if hospital discharge data includes length of stay and time since 
last visit, which are not among the eighteen prohibited identifiers, as many 
as 16.57% of the records could have a high likelihood of re-
identification.177 
c) The Peculiarities of Genetic Information 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not provide explicit guidance 
concerning the de-identification of genetic information,178 such as the 
genetic sequences available through GenBank.179 Many commentators 
have expressed concern that adversaries could re-identify anonymized 
genetic information using a variety of techniques.180 Researchers believe 
that people can be uniquely identified through a sequence of only thirty to 
eighty out of thirty million single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).181 In 
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one study, researchers identified family names by matching short 
sequences of DNA bases on an individual’s Y chromosome to entries in 
recreational genetic genealogy databases.182 These short sequences are 
repeated different numbers of times in different individuals, and hence 
they are called short tandem repeats or Y-STRs. Even providing only 
summary-level genetic information cannot always fully protect the 
identities of data subjects.183 Given genotype frequencies for a study 
cohort, it is possible to determine if a particular individual is in the cohort 
if one knows the individual’s genotype and has a reference set of allele 
frequencies for the underlying population.184 Thus, genetic information 
may be more difficult to de-identify effectively than other types of data.  
B. DISCRIMINATION AND SPECIAL TARGETING 
Medical big data can serve as a treasure trove of information for parties 
who will use it to further their own economic interests.185 The release of 
patient data for public use, alongside advances in re-identification 
capabilities, raises significant concern regarding potential discrimination 
or targeting by parties with a stake in individuals’ health and economic 
welfare.186 This Section will focus on three examples: employers, financial 
institutions, and marketers. Employers have a strong incentive to identify 
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and select the healthiest workers in order to avoid attendance and 
productivity problems and high health insurance costs. Likewise, lenders 
are interested in borrowers who will have income and be able to pay off 
their loans. For their part, advertisers and marketers wish to tailor their 
marketing campaigns to reach the most lucrative markets, and thus, they 
might target particular individuals based on known health conditions187 or 
offer special promotions to some consumers but not others.188  
1. Employers  
Employers go to great lengths to select employees carefully in order to 
maximize business productivity and profitability. Sick or disabled 
employees can be very expensive for employers because of absenteeism, 
performance shortcomings, high insurance costs, loss of customers who 
are uncomfortable interacting with the individual, erosion of workforce 
morale if other workers feel overburdened while the employer 
accommodates the ill or impaired employee, and other problems.189 
Employers may have good economic reasons to strive for the healthiest 
possible workforce, but they are constrained by federal and state laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on a variety of protected classifications, 
including disability and genetic information.190 Moreover, if employers 
make assumptions about people’s health and apply rigid, generalized rules 
to determine which employees are undesirable, they will deprive many 
qualified individuals of job opportunities.  
The advent of publicly available data may enable employers to 
discriminate against individuals who are perceived to be at high risk of 
poor health in ways that are subtle and difficult to detect. Some employers 
are already embracing advanced technologies such as smart badges that 
enable them to monitor employee conduct and analyze workplace 
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interactions as never before.191 They may well pursue opportunities to use 
identifiable, re-identifiable, and even non-identifiable medical data to 
develop new screening tools and hiring policies.  
a) Using Identifiable or Re-Identifiable Data 
Individuals who agree to share identifiable or easily re-identifiable 
medical data with the public on websites such as PatientsLikeMe or the 
Personal Genome Project192 should understand that it will be accessible to 
everyone. This includes not only fellow patients or others with benign 
interests, but also employers who may take adverse action based on health 
concerns.  
Many employers reportedly access public profiles that applicants post 
on social media sites as part of their investigation of candidates’ 
credentials.193 They also ask applicants for permission to obtain their credit 
reports.194 It is therefore not far-fetched to assume that employers will 
search publicly available health profiles as well. It is also possible that 
employers will hire data miners to re-identify medical information when 
doing so is not excessively difficult. Employers or their agents may be able 
to re-identify health records that feature certain items such as postal codes, 
birthdates, and gender, with the aid of demographic information and 
names contained in voter registration lists, credit reports, or job 
applications.195  
Employers may also be able to hire experts who can re-identify 
information that is thoroughly de-identified in compliance with the 
HIPAA safe harbor standard if they have a sufficient amount of related, 
identifiable data about applicants and employees to which they can match 
the de-identified records. For example, data miners may be able to obtain 
individuals’ detailed purchasing histories or web-browsing histories from 
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database marketers such as Acxiom,196 and by some estimates, 
approximately 4000 data brokers already exist.197 If these lists suggest that 
particular workers have certain health conditions, data miners may be able 
to link anonymized health records to names on the lists and thereby 
identify patients and obtain their medical details.  
Experienced data miners, aided by contemporary technology, often 
have no difficulty achieving re-identification. Interested buyers can 
purchase lists of patients with depression, erectile dysfunction, diabetes, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s disease.198 In a 2010 article, two 
computer scientists, Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, went as far 
as to say that “advances in the art and science of re-identification, 
increasing economic incentives for potential attackers, and ready 
availability of personal information about millions of people (for example, 
in online social networks) are rapidly rendering [de-identification] 
obsolete.”199 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from 
engaging in disability-based discrimination.200 The law allows employers 
to conduct medical inquiries and examinations within certain limits to 
determine fitness for duty,201 but workers who feel that an employer 
denied them a job opportunity because of information it discovered may 
sue the employer.202 Unlike medical exams, publicly shared medical data 
would enable employers to view workers’ health information without the 
individuals’ knowledge and, consequently, with little concern about being 
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accused of disability discrimination in case of adverse employment 
decisions.  
b) De-identified Information as a Basis for Multi-Factor 
Discrimination and Discrimination by Proxy  
Employers may use publicly available medical data for purposes of 
screening workers even without attempting to re-identify records. Some 
websites feature information concerning disease trends that might induce 
employers to try to exclude certain classes of employees. For instance, 
CDC Wonder allows users to search for cancer incidence by age, sex, race, 
ethnicity, and region.203 As a hypothetical example, the results of a search 
might lead an employer to conclude that Hispanic women over fifty are 
more prone to several cancers than other individuals, and consequently, to 
decline to hire Hispanic women over fifty.204  
Some researchers have in fact focused on particular ethnic sub-groups 
and concluded that they have more health problems than others. A prime 
example is the PINE Study, for which investigators interviewed 3,018 
Chinese adults aged 60 to 105 who lived in the Chicago area between 
2011 and 2013.205 The study concluded that “Chinese older adults 
experience disproportionate health disparities,” suffering from significant 
physical, psychological, financial, and social challenges.206 Though this was 
far from the study’s intention, readers of the report may think twice about 
hiring people of Chinese ancestry who are sixty or older. While 
investigators used interviews for this study, they could also undertake 
record reviews in the future if sufficient information is available. The 
study’s findings could encourage employers to pursue similar research 
using open medical data, because it will yield clear categories of individuals 
who should be excluded as likely to become problematic employees. 
The civil rights laws prohibit discrimination by race, color sex, and 
age, among other categories,207 but discrimination based on a combination 
of two or more factors would be very difficult to detect and prove. If 
accused of discrimination, the employer would be able to show that it has 
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Hispanic, female, and older employees in its workforce. A plaintiff would 
need to be clever enough to discern that the employer is excluding only a 
subgroup that falls at the intersection of several protected categories and 
then somehow decipher the employer’s motivation for doing so. 
Furthermore, many courts disallow multi-factor claims involving age.208 
These courts perceive “age plus” cases as prohibited by a Supreme Court 
decision, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., that held that a plaintiff 
claiming age discrimination must prove that age was the “but for” reason 
for the adverse action at issue.209 
Anonymized data can provide other opportunities for discrimination 
as well.210 Employers, who are highly motivated to develop means to 
screen out workers at high risk of health problems, may undertake their 
own citizen science projects or hire experts to do so. Employers or their 
agents may mine medical data using sophisticated algorithms to detect 
associations between individual characteristics or behaviors and poor 
physical or mental health.211 Then, through job applications, interviews, 
and reference or background checks, employers could try to determine 
whether applicants have those attributes or behaviors.  
Concern that employers would attempt to find reliable predictors of 
applicants’ future health status is not fanciful. In the words of two 
prominent scholars, “predictive algorithms . . . are increasingly rating 
people in countless aspects of their lives.”212 Several websites, such as 
“Lifespan Calculator” and “How Long Will I Live?,” invite users to 
calculate their longevity based on a series of questions. These websites’ 
calculations may or may not be trustworthy or illuminating, but they 
reflect deep interest in creating health-related predictive tools.213 The 
websites ask users about their height, weight, education, income, marital 
status, exercise habits, smoking, drinking, driving, seat belt use, work 
history, eating, sleeping, and more.214 They also ask a small number of 
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questions about family and personal medical history. If employers asked 
such questions directly, they could be found liable for violations of federal 
anti-discrimination law.215 However, as data mining science continues to 
develop and demand for its products grows, experts will likely develop 
dependable tools that do not require such explicit questions. While 
employers may not care about whether employees will live to be eighty or 
ninety, they will be interested in determining whether they will remain 
healthy and productive during their working lives.  
Already, some employers are known to reject candidates who are obese 
or smoke because of anticipated health problems.216 In the future, they 
might disqualify applicants for many more forms of conduct or 
characteristics. Applicants could routinely be questioned during interviews 
about their eating, exercise, travel, and other habits. Employers may then 
base employment decisions on proxies for disease or predictions of later 
illness without violating state and federal anti-discrimination laws. As 
Professor Jessica Roberts explains, those statutes prohibit discrimination 
based on attributes (for example, race or disability) rather than on behavior 
(for example, consumption of fatty food or a sedentary lifestyle).217 
Furthermore, the laws focus only on current disabilities and genetic 
information and do not govern any assumptions employers might make 
about individuals’ future ailments that do not relate to off-limits genetic 
information.218 
2. Financial Institutions and Marketers 
Like employers, financial institutions collect information about 
individuals. Banks routinely maintain databases with data about customers 
who previously overdrew their accounts or bounced checks.219 Nothing will 
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prevent them from adding health information to their databases in order 
to hone their ability to screen out applicants with a high risk of defaulting 
on loans if such data is attainable at low cost. As suggested above, financial 
institutions may utilize identifiable and easily re-identifiable information 
and may mine databases to discern associations between health risks and 
various attributes or behaviors.220 
The ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination by places of public 
accommodation, that is, establishments that provide services to the public, 
including banks and other financial institutions.221 However, customers are 
unlikely to suspect or discover that banks viewed their health information 
while assessing their loan applications and thus, such acts of 
discrimination will probably go unchallenged. 
Marketers and advertisers also have an interest in individuals’ health 
data. The more they know about potential customers, the more they can 
tailor their materials to appeal to those individuals.222 For example, 
individuals who are known to have diabetes might receive advertisements 
about sugar-free products, which some may perceive as a troubling 
invasion of privacy. Consumers may be particularly resentful when the 
health condition at issue is sensitive, as noted in a 2012 Forbes magazine 
article entitled “How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant 
Before Her Father Did.”223  
Marketers may also engage in discriminatory practices, offering 
promotions and discounts to some customers but not others, or advertising 
selectively so that they reach only certain consumers. They may mine 
health records for clues regarding individuals’ purchasing potential and 
aggressively pursue the most likely or wealthiest customers. A 2014 
presidential report provided the following account:  
[S]ome . . . retailers were found to be using an algorithm that 
generated different discounts for the same product to people 
based on where they believed the customer was located. While it 
may be that the price differences were driven by the lack of 
competition in certain neighborhoods, in practice, people in 
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higher-income areas received higher discounts than people in 
lower-income areas.224  
While this practice already exists, access to open medical data may 
enable industry to refine marketing campaigns even further, to the dismay 
of some customers. Moreover, courts are unlikely to find that selective 
advertising or promotional offers and discounts violate anti-discrimination 
laws.225 Marketers will generally be able to argue convincingly that their 
decisions were based on economic factors rather than on race, disability, or 
other protected categories.226 
C. PROPAGATION OF INCORRECT AND HARMFUL RESEARCH 
CONCLUSIONS 
Citizen science can lead to valuable and illuminating discoveries.227 At 
the same time, however, amateurs may reach incorrect conclusions.228 
Furthermore, anyone can widely publicize information on the Internet, 
whether it be correct or erroneous. Advice as to how to gain broad 
exposure is abundantly available on the Internet and can be found in 
webpages such as “12 Ways to Promote Your Blog”229 and “How to 
Promote Your Article Online.”230 In some cases, the media, celebrities, 
and politicians highlight the work of ordinary citizens,231 and they may 
well do so with respect to scientific discoveries that they find intriguing or 
that support their own agendas. In other cases, individuals can gain 
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attention through word of mouth and social media, as happens when a 
YouTube video or blog post “goes viral.”232  
While professional researchers most often seek publication in peer-
reviewed journals that carefully scrutinize submissions, nothing will stop 
citizen scientists from posting their study results on blogs, personal web 
pages, and other electronic publications, making them instantaneously 
available to a worldwide audience.233 Some commentators describe this 
phenomenon in terms of a shift from “intermediation” to 
“apomediation.”234 Traditionally, peer reviewed journals served as 
necessary intermediaries between researchers and readers and thus 
gatekeepers for scientific knowledge. The Internet has now triggered 
disintermediation and increased use of apomediaries, agents or tools that 
guide readers to information without any middlemen required.235 Many 
reports published on websites appear highly professional and credible to 
general readers, who are not always sophisticated about distinguishing 
between reliable and questionable sources of information.236  
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Incorrect findings are unlikely to be a rarity. They will stem from a 
variety of failings and potentially lead to a number of different harms. 
1. Error Sources 
Erroneous findings could be caused by poor data quality in the original 
dataset or flawed study design.237 Data quality deficiencies may result from 
clinicians’ data entry errors in electronic health records, fragmented or 
incomplete electronic health records, data coding inaccuracies, or 
problems with software that processes or analyzes data.238 Highly skilled 
analysts should be able to recognize data quality problems, adjust for them, 
and estimate error rates, but amateurs may not know how.239 
Furthermore, scientific studies can be flawed due to a variety of biases. 
Selection bias arises when the group of subjects studied is not 
representative of the population as a whole, and thus, researchers cannot 
generalize study results.240 For example, researchers using information 
from PatientsLikeMe or the Personal Genome Project should assume that 
individuals who choose to make their medical information public on such 
websites are a self-selected group (perhaps more educated and more 
interested in research) that is not typical of average patients. Confounding 
bias occurs when there are relevant variables that researchers neglect to 
consider that affect treatment choices and outcomes, and thus, the study’s 
results are skewed.241 For example, low income may be a confounder 
because it may cause individuals to select inferior, inexpensive treatments 
and may also separately lead to poor health because of stress or inadequate 
nutrition.242 Measurement bias is a concern when measurements are 
inaccurate because equipment has failed, patients have reported facts 
incorrectly, or other problems have occurred in the process of collecting 
and measuring values.243 Consequently, researchers face many hurdles and 
must conduct their studies very skillfully in order to derive valid results. 
 
 237. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is 
Bigger Really Better?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 515–27 (2013). 
 238. Id. at 515–21. 
 239. Id. at 530–32. 
 240. Id. at 521–23. 
 241. Id. at 523–25. 
 242. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and 
Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SUPPLEMENT ON 2012 PUB. HEALTH L. 
CONF.) 56, 58 (2013). 
 243. Id.  
  
2015] CITIZEN SCIENCE 1783 
Researchers must be particularly sensitive to the difference between 
association and causation.244 They may identify associations between certain 
behaviors, exposures, or treatments and particular outcomes but wrongly 
assume that there is a causal relationship between the two.245 To illustrate, 
suppose that a citizen scientist concludes that people who eat acai berries 
live longer than those who do not eat this fruit. Does this mean that acai 
berry consumption prolongs life? Probably not. The explanation for this 
finding may well be that individuals who purchase this exotic fruit are 
generally well-off and have the means to make careful food choices, to 
exercise, to limit their stress, and to obtain top-notch medical care. Thus, 
it may be true that eating acai berries is associated with a longer life on 
average; but it does not follow that acai berries have some property that 
actually causes people to live longer.  
Crowdfunding246 may add another element of uncertainty to research 
quality. Crowdfunding does not depend on peer review of carefully written 
grant proposals by professional experts.247 Rather, researchers aim to 
appeal to a large number of donors through videos and social media 
campaigns.248 Some commentators have accused crowdfunding of turning 
“science into a popularity contest.”249 It is certainly possible that the 
“crowd” will ignore the most meritorious proposals and opt to fund 
projects that are less deserving but more media-friendly and tantalizing.250 
Consequently, studies that are funded in this manner may not be of the 
highest quality. 
2. Potential Harms 
While many mistaken conclusions will be benign, some could be 
harmful. Patients reading incorrect information about their diseases may 
become unnecessarily anxious or, in the opposite case, overly sanguine 
about their symptoms and fail to seek needed medical care.  
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Worse yet, individuals with personal agendas may undertake scientific 
studies with malevolent intent. They may use findings to inflame passion 
and prejudice against particular minority groups. Some may attempt to 
further political agendas by “proving” that their opponents’ policies have 
adverse effects on human health or the healthcare system. Others with 
selfish economic interests may aim to hurt competitors by claiming that 
their products cause particular ailments.251  
Even peer-reviewed journals have published articles whose conclusions 
are false. A notorious example is a 1998 study published in the prestigious 
journal Lancet, that suggested a link between autism and the measles, 
mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccination.252 While the study was later 
retracted,253 the belief that vaccinations can lead to autism gained a 
considerable foothold and still needs to be explicitly repudiated on the 
CDC’s website.254  
Researchers who are media-savvy or web-savvy and do not submit 
their findings to peer-reviewed journals for review by experts may be all 
the more likely to propagate incorrect and potentially harmful views. 
Manuscripts that are not submitted to journals will not be scrutinized by 
experts before their authors post them on the Internet, and no filtering 
mechanism exists to indicate to readers whether the material is valid or 
trustworthy.255 The Internet provides publishing opportunities without any 
need for intermediaries and oversight. Therefore, potentially, millions of 
readers could view and believe even nonsensical conclusions, especially 
when authors assert that they based their research on data that the 
government furnished. 
Many myths have in fact gained considerable traction despite the 
existence of abundant evidence to negate them. Two examples are climate 
change denial256 and the outcry that the Patient Protection and Affordable 
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Care Act (aka Obamacare) would authorize “death panels” to decide 
which patients should live and which should die.257 In both cases, the 
arguments gained popularity because high-profile public figures embraced 
them to further their own political agendas, which may occur in many 
other instances as well. 
A particularly pernicious argument was made by Michael Levin in a 
1997 book called Why Race Matters.258 The author argued that African-
Americans are typically less intelligent and more aggressive, assertive, and 
impulsive than Whites.259 In addition, according to the author, African-
Americans are more likely to commit crimes because they suffer from “an 
absence of conscience,” lack the ability to engage in self-monitoring, and 
have less free will and a different moral orientation from Whites.260 In an 
era in which anyone in the world can access Internet material without 
leaving home or paying any money for a publication, these types of 
purportedly research-backed arguments can be more dangerous than ever 
before. 
D. LITIGATION 
Open health data may lead to a proliferation of litigation or threats of 
litigation in several circumstances. First, parties who feel they were injured 
by published invalid research outcomes may assert claims such as 
defamation or interference with economic advantage. Second, business 
entities may threaten to sue or file frivolous cases against citizen scientists 
who have acted in good faith and posted legitimate findings because the 
companies fear that the research outcomes will harm them. Thus, parties 
could use litigation to intimidate citizen scientists and pressure them to 
retract and remove purportedly offending materials. Third, data subjects 
who feel that they are victims of unauthorized disclosure of identifiable 
medical data may assert common law privacy breach claims. This Section 
analyzes several potential causes of action and the protection provided in 
some states by legislation that prohibits strategic lawsuits against public 
participation (SLAPPs).  
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1. Defamation 
Defamation claims generally require proof of the following elements:  
(1) publication (to a third party) (2) of a defamatory statement 
(3) “of and concerning” the plaintiff (4) that is false, (5) 
published with requisite degree of fault (negligence or actual 
malice), and (6) damages the plaintiff’s reputation (which, in 
some instances, can be presumed).261 
Establishing a successful defamation claim is no easy task, and 
plaintiffs must meet a high standard of proof.262 Electronic speech is 
entitled to the same stringent First Amendment protections as print 
communication.263  
Nevertheless, both individuals and entities may bring defamation 
claims.264 For example, a manufacturer may file a defamation suit relating 
to the publication of intentionally false statements asserting that its 
product causes health problems. However, as a rule, defamatory 
statements against groups are not actionable.265 Thus, if an author 
published or posted a piece asserting that Jews or African-Americans are 
biologically inferior in some way, Jewish or African-American plaintiffs 
could not bring a defamation claim, no matter how baseless and offensive 
the publication was.  
An increasing number of defamation cases involve material posted on 
the Internet, which is the most likely venue for citizen science 
publications.266 For example, businesses have filed defamation suits in 
response to negative reviews on the website Yelp.267  
 
 261. Matthew E. Kelley & Steven D. Zansberg, A Little Birdie Told Me, “You’re A 
Crook”: Libel in the Twittersphere and Beyond, 30 COMM. LAW. 34 (2014); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
 262. K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: the Good, the Bad, and the Right of 
Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 534 (2008) (stating that “defamation law sets very high 
standards of proof and injury to prevent conflict with First Amendment principles”). 
 263. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (asserting that “our cases provide no 
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium [the Internet]”). 
 264. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment and 
Securities Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903, 918–20 (2014) (discussing defamation suits 
brought by entities and individuals). 
 265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977); Ellyn Tracy Marcus, 
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1532, 1533 (1983). 
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A particularly memorable defamation case brought by industry 
involved a discussion on Oprah Winfrey’s television show.268 After 
scientists linked the consumption of beef from cattle infected by Mad 
Cow Disease with a new variant of the deadly Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, 
the Oprah Winfrey Show, like many other media outlets, covered the story 
in a segment entitled “Dangerous Foods.”269 At one point in the show Ms. 
Winfrey stated that she was “stopped cold from eating another burger.”270 
Subsequently, several Texas cattlemen sued Ms. Winfrey and other 
defendants, asserting numerous causes of action, including defamation, 
and claiming that the beef market suffered significant losses because of the 
broadcast.271 Fortunately for Oprah, the defendants prevailed on all 
claims.272 
In some cases, plaintiffs may well have legitimate claims against 
individuals who maliciously publicize damaging information that they 
know to be false. In fact, the prospect of facing defamation claims may be 
an important deterrent to such misconduct. However, it is not difficult to 
imagine that in other instances, the chilling effect of litigation will thwart 
the dissemination of non-defamatory information. Industry may file 
lawsuits primarily to intimidate citizen scientists and force them to comply 
with demands for removal or retraction of material that they researched 
and posted in good faith. Citizen scientists who are far less powerful and 
prosperous than Oprah Winfrey may be unable to mount a full defense 
and simply capitulate.273 
2. Other Causes of Action 
Plaintiffs may file a myriad of other claims, only a few of which will be 
discussed as examples below. The cattle ranchers who sued Oprah 
Winfrey alleged not only defamation but also the closely related tort of 
business disparagement as well as negligence and negligence per se.274 In 
addition, companies that feel their products have been inappropriately 
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denigrated may bring a claim of interference with economic advantage. 
This theory of liability typically involves proof of the following elements: 
(1) plaintiff had an economic relationship with a third party that would 
have likely been economically beneficial for the plaintiff, (2) the defendant 
knew of the relationship, (3) the defendant engaged in intentional or 
negligent acts designed to disrupt the relationship, (4) the relationship was 
in fact disrupted, and (5) the defendant’s conduct proximately caused 
plaintiff to suffer economic harm.275 Individuals and entities subjected to 
published criticism or negative commentary often assert allegations of 
tortious interference with economic advantage alongside defamation 
claims.276 
Patients whose data were used for research purposes may also initiate 
litigation. A patient who believes she did not consent to the posting of her 
identifiable medical records may assert a claim of public disclosure of 
private facts, a tort with the following elements: “(1) public disclosure (2) 
of a private fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the 
reasonable person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.”277 
There is no precedent for applying this theory of liability to re-identified 
data, but in the future, parties may attempt to invoke it in such 
circumstances. If re-identified medical information were posted on the 
Internet or otherwise publicized, the affected individuals may well find the 
conduct objectionable, and courts are likely to agree that the health 
records are not of public concern, thus ruling for plaintiffs. 
3. Anti-SLAPP Legislation 
Citizen scientists can take a degree of comfort in the existence of anti-
SLAPP legislation in some states.278 Strategic lawsuits against public 
participation (SLAPPs) have been defined as “civil complaints or 
counterclaims (against either an individual or an organization) in which 
the alleged injury was the result of petitioning or free speech activities 
protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”279 For 
 
 275. Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1404 (2014) 
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example, SLAPPs have been filed by businesses as a form of retaliation 
against consumers who posted negative comments about them on social 
networking sites.280 There is thus reason to worry that some companies 
will file SLAPPs against citizen scientists who claim that their products 
are inferior to others or cause health-related harms. 
Anti-SLAPP statutes have been enacted in twenty-eight states, the 
District of Columbia, and Guam.281 These laws enable defendants subject 
to certain frivolous allegations to have SLAPPs dismissed quickly and to 
recover costs and attorneys’ fees.282 The statutes can vary significantly.283 
Pennsylvania’s law is very narrow, granting immunity to defendants who 
make “an oral or written communication to a government agency relating 
to enforcement or implementation of an environmental law or 
regulation . . . .”284 By contrast, in California the law is much broader and 
covers “written or oral statement[s] or writing made in a place open to the 
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.”285 
The Pennsylvania law allows defendants to request hearings at which the 
court will determine whether they are entitled to immunity.286 The 
California law establishes a somewhat different procedure, allowing a 
covered defendant to file a special motion to strike, after which the court 
will require the plaintiff to produce evidence that it is likely to prevail on 
its claim. In the absence of such evidence, the claim will be dismissed and 
defendant will recover attorney’s fees and costs.287 Protection is 
inconsistent across jurisdictions but may be very helpful to some victims of 
frivolous litigation initiated for purposes of harassment and intimidation. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The growing trend of opening patient-related data held by the 
government and private entities to the public raises hopes for considerable 
benefits. At the same time, it provokes significant concerns. How should 
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legislators and regulators respond to this emerging phenomenon? The law 
must balance the interests of a variety of stakeholders: patients, 
professional researchers, citizen scientists, government, industry, and the 
public at large. An excessively heavy-handed approach to regulation might 
discourage citizen scientists from pursuing projects and making important 
contributions and may deter data custodians from releasing records. 
However, a regulatory approach that is too timid may result in privacy 
breaches, discrimination, and other societal harms. This Part formulates 
recommendations for regulatory and policy modifications to address open 
data concerns. 
A. PRIVACY AND DATA STEWARDSHIP 
The risk that anonymized health information will be re-identified and 
used inappropriately can never be fully eliminated,288 but it can be 
minimized. Several legal and policy interventions could enhance privacy 
protections. First, the HIPAA Privacy Rule should be amended to expand 
the definition of “covered entity” and to add a provision that prohibits re-
identification. Second, any party releasing patient-related data to the 
public should establish a data release review board that will scrutinize all 
disclosed data sets to ensure that they are de-identified as effectively as 
possible. The review board should also oversee other privacy protections, 
including privacy training for data recipients, data use agreements, user 
registries, and consent procedures for data subjects opting to share 
identifiable information. 
1. HIPAA Privacy Rule Modifications 
Two HIPAA Privacy Rule changes should be made to enhance data 
subject privacy. The HIPAA statute and regulations should be amended 
to expand their reach and efficacy through a broader definition of “covered 
entity” and an explicit prohibition of any attempt to re-identify data.  
a) Expanding the Definition of “Covered Entity” and Creating 
National Data Release and De-identification Standards 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule currently governs only healthcare providers, 
health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and their business associates.289 It 
therefore does not apply to numerous parties that store and disclose health 
information, including government entities and database operators. 
Expansion of the definition of “covered entity” in the HIPAA Privacy 
 
 288. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 289. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–.103 (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 17934 (2010). 
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Rule and its enabling legislation290 could improve privacy protection for 
data subjects. Regulators could turn to a Texas privacy statute as a model 
for more comprehensive coverage. The law defines “covered entity” in 
relevant part as any party who, 
for commercial, financial, or professional gain, monetary fees, or 
dues, or on a cooperative, nonprofit, or pro bono basis, engages, 
in whole or in part, and with real or constructive knowledge, in 
the practice of assembling, collecting, analyzing, using, 
evaluating, storing, or transmitting protected health information. 
The term includes a business associate, health care payer, 
governmental unit, information or computer management entity, 
school, health researcher, health care facility, clinic, health care 
provider, or person who maintains an Internet site.291 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s scope of coverage should be similarly 
broadened, with one modification. The regulations should explicitly reach 
employers, financial institutions, and amateur researchers, along with the 
parties listed in the definition above.  
The proposed regulatory expansion should not inhibit the release of 
data to the public. Rather, it would provide all data holders with clear 
instructions regarding privacy safeguards and create uniform, national 
standards for data disclosure and de-identification.292 Those releasing 
identifiable information, such as PatientsLikeMe or the Personal Genome 
Project would need to obtain meaningful patient consent,293 as discussed in 
greater detail below.294 Those who wish to be exempt from HIPAA 
coverage would need to de-identify disclosed data in accordance with the 
Privacy Rule’s de-identification provision.295  
In some cases, data holders will want to release information that is 
largely anonymized but contains a few identifiers that are particularly 
useful for research purposes. In these instances, database operators would 
follow the Privacy Rule’s “limited data set” provision.296 In limited data 
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sets, custodians redact most of the safe harbor provision’s eighteen 
identifiers but retain dates and geographic locales, including city or town, 
state, and postal codes.297 Database operators may release limited data sets 
without patient authorization so long as data recipients sign data use 
agreements containing specified restrictions and privacy protections.298 
These agreements are required because the added identifiers, while 
valuable to analysts, make re-identification considerably easier for skilled 
attackers.299 
The proposed change would modify only the definition of “covered 
entity.” It would not impact the exceptions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
that the regulations establish elsewhere.300 Thus, the proposal would not 
create hurdles for health care treatment, payment, administration, or the 
activities of law enforcement and public health officials.301  
b) Prohibiting Re-identification 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule should also be amended to include a general 
prohibition of any attempt to re-identify information that would apply to 
any user of de-identified data.302 This restriction is already an element of 
data use agreements, which require the recipients of limited data sets to 
promise that they will not “identify the information or contact the 
individuals.”303 The proposed change would extend this regulatory 
proscription to anyone using de-identified information, including 
employers, financial institutions, and all other parties. The provision could 
specify exceptions, such as permitting re-identification necessary to 
respond to medical or public health emergencies. Violators should be 
subject to HIPAA’s enforcement provisions, which incorporate civil and 
criminal penalties.304 
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2. Data Release Review Boards 
In the absence of HIPAA Privacy Rule amendments, data custodians 
not currently covered by the Rule should implement their own privacy 
safeguards. Database operators who release patient-related information to 
the public should institute a thoughtful and thorough process for 
reviewing the information at issue and establishing strong privacy 
safeguards.  
The CDC’s Policy on Releasing and Sharing Data recommends the 
establishment of data-release review boards, and data custodians would be 
wise to implement this suggestion.305 The boards, composed of data 
mining and privacy experts, would review any data that are to be released 
to ascertain that they are as effectively de-identified as possible. For 
example, the board would assess whether the disclosed sample size is so 
small that data subjects are likely to be identified no matter what variables 
are stripped away, as may be the case when data is collected about very rare 
diseases.306 The board would also determine what statistical methods 
should be used to achieve de-identification of various data sets, including 
suppression, perturbation, and generalization.307 In addition, the board 
could analyze data quality to ensure that the released information is 
sufficiently reliable that it will be of value to users.308 Finally, the data-
release review board should oversee all other privacy safeguards that data 
holders implement.  
3. Data Use Agreements, Privacy Training, Registries, and Consent 
Procedures 
Data custodians who release medical information to the public should 
implement several privacy protection measures beyond board review, and 
the extent of these procedures should depend on the type of data at issue. 
Users who access any database of medical information, including 
aggregate, summary-level data, should be alerted that the information is 
sensitive and raises privacy concerns. For example, the CDC Wonder 
website asks viewers who are seeking mortality information from its 
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database to agree to a short list of data use restrictions by clicking an “I 
agree” icon.309  
For patient-level data that is not aggregated, more elaborate 
procedures are needed. The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project’s 
National (Nationwide) Inpatient Sample (NIS) furnishes a useful model. 
The NIS contains information concerning millions of hospital stays.310 It 
provides detailed information about patients and hospitals but is careful to 
remove identifiers and most likely meets the HIPAA safe harbor 
standard.311 Nevertheless, the NIS requires purchasers of the data to take a 
15-minute training course that addresses privacy concerns.312 It also 
requires purchasers to sign a detailed data use agreement that specifies a 
variety of use restrictions designed to protect individual and institutional 
data subjects from privacy violations and other abuses, such as attempts to 
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gain commercial or competitive advantage through analysis of released 
NIS data.313  
If data users violate the agreement, the NIS would presumably 
challenge them in court.314 A useful supplement to the NIS’s requirements 
would be an online test in which examinees would have to demonstrate 
that they read and understood the training materials and data use 
agreement.  
Admittedly, training courses and data use agreements will not prevent 
all privacy violations, and data custodians are not likely to dedicate 
significant resources to their enforcement. However, these measures will 
alert the public to the importance of privacy and responsible data handling 
and may avert innocent breaches by citizen scientists who wish to do no 
harm.  
Equally important, the data use agreement requirement will create a 
record of those accessing data, and data custodians should maintain 
functional registries of users. Data custodians can require signatories to 
provide their name, affiliation, and contact information.315 If the dataset at 
issue consists of lower-risk, aggregated or summary data and users do no 
more than click on an “I agree” icon, only their network addresses will be 
recorded. Nevertheless, if the individuals used their own computers, 
authorities could link the network addresses to their identities if need 
be.316 Data custodians could then preclude those who violate data use 
agreements by re-identifying data or engaging in other misconduct from 
downloading information in the future, and the government could subject 
such violators to other penalties.317 
In some cases, privacy requirements should apply not only to data 
users, but also to data subjects. Specifically, individuals choosing to allow 
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public access to identifiable or easily identifiable data, such as datasets that 
include birth date, sex, and zip code,318 should undergo a comprehensive 
informed consent process.319 Such data subjects should understand that 
their personal health information will be viewable not only by researchers 
with good intentions, but also by employers, marketers, financial 
institutions, and others who may not have their best interest in mind.320 
To this end, the Harvard Personal Genome Project requires participants 
to read and sign a lengthy consent document. They also must pass an 
examination demonstrating their understanding of the material contained 
in the consent form.321 Testing data subjects’ comprehension of the privacy 
risks they accept would be an important component of any informed 
consent process pertaining to sharing individually identifiable data. 
B. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS 
Ironically, while open data policies promote transparency on the 
government’s part,322 they may provide new opportunities for employers 
and others to discriminate in non-transparent ways.323 Based on data about 
various health risks, entities might discriminate against discrete population 
sub-groups such as African-American women older than fifty.324 These 
multi-factor discrimination cases are much more difficult to detect and 
prosecute than cases involving traditional protected classes.325 In addition, 
entities may retain experts to mine data and develop new applicant 
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screening tools that focus on proxies for disability or predictors of bad 
health that employers can consider without violating any explicit legal 
prohibition.326 As open data and data mining proliferate, novel forms of 
health-based discrimination may become increasingly common and 
require several changes to anti-discrimination law and practice.  
1. Detecting, Deterring, and Prosecuting Multi-Factor 
Discrimination 
As difficult as multi-factor discrimination may be to detect, 
enforcement agencies and plaintiffs’ attorneys will need to recognize the 
real possibility that it is occurring.327 An uptick in litigation and 
enforcement actions relating to multi-factor cases may encourage victims 
to bring this type of discrimination to light and discourage employers and 
businesses from engaging in it. 
In multi-factor cases, plaintiffs claiming employment discrimination 
who believe that one of the improperly considered attributes was their age 
may face particular hurdles because of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. This decision barred mixed-motive 
claims and required “but for” proof of age discrimination.328 However, in 
Gross the employer allegedly considered a mixture of proper (performance-
related) and improper (the plaintiff’s age of fifty-four) factors rather than a 
combination of prohibited categories (for example, age, race, sex).329 In a 
future case, the Supreme Court may revisit the question of whether 
plaintiffs can sue employers for discriminating based on age and one or 
more other protected classifications and hold that such claims are 
allowable. In the alternative, Congress could amend the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act to add a provision that explicitly 
permits multi-factor claims.330 
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2. Requiring Disclosure of Data Mining for Disability Proxies and 
Predictors 
Instances in which employers, financial institutions, or others engage 
in data mining and exclude individuals based on perceived or anticipated 
health conditions will also be difficult to detect. Consequently, anti-
discrimination laws should include a requirement that businesses disclose 
their data mining practices to workers, consumers, and other parties that 
are affected by such practices. 
Several other commentators have called for transparency with respect 
to data mining and predictive modeling activities. Professors Danielle 
Citron and Frank Pasquale argue that “we need to switch the default in 
situations like this away from an assumption of secrecy, and toward the 
expectation that people deserve to know how they are rated and ranked.”331 
Similarly, commentators Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz would require 
parties to provide notice, “disclosing not only the type of predictions they 
attempt, but also the general sources of data that they draw upon as 
inputs, including a means whereby those whose personal data is included 
can learn of that fact.”332 
A disclosure requirement would be a valuable addition to anti-
discrimination protections. It would constitute a compromise between 
prohibiting data mining practices altogether and ignoring them. A tweak 
of the ADA’s medical inquiry and exam provision333 could add a 
requirement that employers disclose in writing to applicants and 
employees any medical data mining activities that they intend to use for 
purposes of making employment decisions. This information would then 
be available to plaintiffs’ attorneys and government enforcement agencies 
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),334 
which could investigate whether these activities resulted in unlawful 
discrimination. Likewise, the ADA’s public accommodation title could 
feature the same provision to cover financial institutions and other 
businesses.335 Employment or loan application forms could include 
disclosure statements so long as the statements were in sufficiently large 
and readable print or on separate sheets given to applicants.  
 
 331. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 185, at 21.  
 332. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 185, at 125. 
 333. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2010). 
 334. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the federal agency tasked 
with enforcing the federal anti-discrimination laws. See Overview, EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015).  
 335. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2010). 
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Some may object that such a requirement will open the floodgates of 
litigation, especially in employment discrimination cases, because any 
applicant who receives notice of an employer’s data mining activities and 
who is not hired or promoted could claim discrimination. Employment 
discrimination claimants, however, must exhaust their administrative 
remedies prior to filing suit.336 While the EEOC and state administrative 
agencies would likely be able to hire experts to investigate and interpret 
employers’ data mining activities in selected instances, they pursue 
litigation in only a handful of cases each year because of limited 
resources.337 The vast majority of claimants, whose cases the government 
will not pursue, will need to find an attorney interested in investing the 
time and money in delving into the technicalities of data mining activities, 
which may be no easy task.338 Furthermore, plaintiffs would have 
legitimate claims only if they were subjected to discrimination based on 
legally protected characteristics such as race or disability. Still, the 
existence of a disclosure requirement may deter at least some employers 
from engaging in unlawful discrimination and depriving qualified 
employees of job opportunities. 
3. Addressing Data Mining in the ADA’s Definition of Disability 
The ADA defines “disability” very broadly339 and prohibits employers, 
financial institutions, and others from discriminating against individuals 
based on a belief that they currently have physical or mental impairments. 
The ADA’s “regarded as” provision explicitly states that an individual is 
protected by the statute if “he or she has been subjected to an action 
prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived 
to limit a major life activity.”340 
 
 336. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)–(f), 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (addressing EEOC enforcement 
responsibilities). Title III of the ADA, which covers public accommodations such as 
financial institutions does not include a similar requirement that plaintiffs exhaust 
administrative remedies. See Hill v. Park, No. 03-4677, 2004 WL 180044 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
27, 2004). 
 337. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2015) (indicating that in fiscal year 2013, the EEOC filed only 148 lawsuits 
nationwide). 
 338. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better than It Looks, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 790 (2008) (estimating that only 5% of individuals with 
employment discrimination claims who turn to private attorneys for help are actually able 
to retain counsel). 
 339. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2010). 
 340. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2010). 
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However, the ADA does not ban discrimination against individuals 
who are neither currently impaired nor perceived as impaired but are 
deemed to be at risk of being unhealthy in the future because of their 
eating habits, exposure to toxins, or a myriad of other concerns.341 Thus, 
for example, so long as employers do not consider genetic factors,342 they 
can exclude such workers without being challenged.  
If open data enables discrimination against high health-risk individuals 
and such discrimination becomes increasingly common, legislators would 
be wise to respond to it. An easy fix would be to add language to the 
“regarded as” provision of the ADA indicating that individuals are also 
regarded as disabled if they have been subjected to an adverse action 
because they are perceived as likely to develop physical or mental 
impairments in the future.  
C. CITIZEN SCIENTIST CHAPERONING 
Several mechanisms should be developed to assist citizen scientists in 
conducting, validating, and publishing their research. “Chaperoning” 
citizen scientists by means of research support and filtering tools could 
reduce the potential for widespread dissemination of erroneous and 
harmful research conclusions.343  
First, government agencies, academic institutions, and other research 
experts should develop educational resources and best practices guidelines 
to assist citizen scientists in conducting research.344 These documents or 
videos could be posted on database websites, and users could be required 
or encouraged to review them, along with privacy training materials, 
before signing data use agreements.345 Data custodians could also test users 
 
 341. See id. 
 342. See Hoffman, supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act). 
 343. See supra Section IV.C. 
 344. CDC/ATSDR POLICY ON RELEASING AND SHARING DATA, supra note 111, 
at 7 (urging CDC staff to develop “[i]nstructions for non-CDC users on the appropriate 
use of the data”); JOHN P. HOLDREN, OFFICE SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM, INCREASING ACCESS TO THE RESULTS OF 
FEDERALLY FUNDED SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 6 (2013) https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ostp_public_access_memo_2013.pdf (urging federal 
agencies, in coordination with the private sector, to “support training, education, and 
workforce development related to scientific data management, analysis, storage, 
preservation, and stewardship”). 
 345. See supra Section V.A.3. 
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on these materials in order to ensure that they have read and understood 
them prior to signing the agreement.346 
Second, citizen scientists should have opportunities to have their work 
vetted, validated, and published in platforms that are recognized as 
reliable. Without such mechanisms, readers will be unable to discern 
whether citizen scientists’ findings are trustworthy.  
One option is to follow the Wikipedia paradigm. Wikipedia allows the 
public to post and edit articles, but the site provides some degree of 
oversight and quality control.347 Authors can request reviews of their 
entries from peers, and Wikipedia administrators have authority to delete 
and undelete pages, protect pages from editing, and take other actions.348 
In extreme cases, administrators, of whom there are over 1,400, can 
temporarily or permanently bar authors from contributing to Wikipedia 
because of intentional and persistent misconduct.349 In addition, 
Wikipedia has an extensive dispute resolution system for disagreements 
about the contents of Wikipedia pages.350 Wikipedia encourages readers 
who find passages that are biased or erroneous to improve them and 
discuss the problem with the original author. Parties may also ask for a 
third opinion or for a moderated discussion through the Dispute 
Resolution Noticeboard, or they can initiate open requests for comments 
from the community at large or requests for mediation with help from the 
Mediation Committee.351 
A similar venue could be established for the publication of citizen 
scientists’ reports and findings that are not submitted to traditional 
journals. Opportunities for editing by other professional and amateur 
scientists, dispute resolution mechanisms, and other forms of oversight 
would significantly enhance the reliability of posted materials. The venue’s 
policy should also require authors to disclose any computer programs that 
 
 346. See Participation Documents, supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 347. Policies and Guidelines, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 5, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://en
.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines&oldid=703418205. 
 348. Editor Review, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:24 PM) https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=Wikipedia:Editor_review&oldid=694475551; Administrators, WIKIPEDIA 
(Jan. 28, 2016, 2:56 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Administrators
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 349. Id.; Policies and Guidelines, supra note 347.  
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they used to analyze the data so that others can replicate and verify their 
research.352  
Opportunities for peer review of citizen science research outcomes 
would provide significant benefits. The contemporary scientific 
community is open to innovation and several hybrid peer review models 
are emerging. For example, F1000Research is a pioneering open access 
journal for life scientists.353 F1000Research reviews submitted articles 
internally and, if it initially deems them meritorious, it publishes them 
within a week of submission, together with their underlying datasets, 
making all materials publicly available. The service only then sends articles 
for peer review. Another novelty is that F1000Research discloses its 
reviewers’ identities and enables authors to communicate with the 
reviewers to address their concerns. Authors may publish revised 
manuscripts,354 and articles that peer reviewers approve are indexed in 
external databases such as PubMed.355  
Peerage of Science offers a second non-traditional approach.356 
Authors submit manuscripts to the service rather than directly to journals. 
Authors set their own deadlines for reviews, and any qualified reviewer 
with a prior peer-reviewed publication can submit a review. A second 
stage of the process reviews the initial reviewers’ assessments.357 Authors 
can accept offers from participating journals or export reviews outside of 
Peerage of Science to journals of their choice.358  
F1000Research and Peerage of Science demonstrate the contemporary 
spirit of innovation in the academic community. They are not suggested as 
venues for amateur citizen scientists, because they are designed for 
professional scientists producing conventional scholarship. The future, 
however, may herald different models to chaperone citizen scientists. 
Whether these follow the Wikipedia paradigm or another path, they 
would assist not only researchers in improving and publicizing their work, 
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but also the reading public in filtering out research findings that have no 
reliable basis.359 
D. TORT CLAIM LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Parties who are hurt by citizen scientists’ wrongdoing will have a 
variety of avenues to seek redress. Plaintiffs may allege defamation, 
interference with economic advantage, public disclosure of private facts, 
and other claims.360 Database operators who require data recipients to sign 
data use agreements may also sue for breach of contract if (1) recipients 
attempt to re-identify information, use data for commercial or competitive 
purposes, or violate other agreement provisions, and (2) the breaches 
damage the database’s reputation or economic interests.361 
Of greater concern are instances in which parties may file suit against 
citizen scientists who act in good faith but publicize information critical of 
the plaintiffs’ products or conduct. Businesses may hope to intimidate and 
deter citizen scientists and to force them to disavow and remove any 
offending material.362 Citizen scientists who publish their data outside of 
traditional academic journals will not have a defense based on scrutiny and 
approval by highly qualified peer reviewers. Such citizen scientists will 
have no academic institution committed to their vigorous defense. 
In some states, defendants will be able to utilize anti-SLAPP 
legislation and have cases quickly dismissed.363 If amateur researchers 
make valuable contributions to science but are routinely harassed through 
frivolous litigation, additional states may respond with anti-SLAPP 
statutes that cover such cases.  
In the meantime, citizen scientist advocacy organizations can develop 
educational materials that address strategies to minimize the risk of 
liability. To this end, the Harvard-affiliated Digital Media Law Project 
offers “Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability Associated with Harms to 
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Reputation.”364 The long list of detailed suggestions includes, among 
others:  
 Strive to be as accurate as possible; 
 Use reliable sources; 
 Seek comment from the subjects of your statements, when 
appropriate; 
 Document your research; 
 Keep an eye out for “Red Flag” statements [e.g., explicitly 
accusing someone of criminal or immoral conduct]; 
 Be cautious when publishing negative information about 
businesses; 
 Where possible, get consent from the people you cover; 
 Be willing to correct or retract your mistakes.365 
Lawsuits can be expensive and traumatic even if they come to a quick 
end. Precautions will not prevent litigation in every case, but citizen 
scientists would be wise to heed experts’ advice in order to minimize the 
likelihood of being sued and facing liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The medical and scientific communities are rapidly adopting a culture 
of data sharing, and the expansion of open data practices is widely 
perceived as inevitable.366 Many stakeholders are grappling with the legal 
and ethical implications of public access to patient-related data. For 
example, the prestigious Institute of Medicine is in the process of crafting 
a document entitled “Strategies for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial 
Data.”367  
Open medical data have the potential to yield numerous benefits, 
including scientific discoveries, cost savings, new patient support tools, 
improved healthcare quality, greater government transparency, and public 
education.368 At the same time, open data raise several complex legal and 
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ethical concerns related to privacy, discrimination, erroneous research 
findings, and litigation.369  
Scientists and policy-makers must carefully consider the varied 
implications of making patient-related big data available to the public. In 
the future, they may devise a detailed regulatory framework for citizen 
science.370 Until then, government, industry, data custodians, and others 
should implement the more modest interventions proposed in this Article 
to protect all stakeholders: patients, researchers, businesses, and the public 
at large.  
In his May 2013 executive order, President Obama asserted that 
“making information resources easy to find, accessible, and usable can fuel 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and scientific discovery that improves 
Americans’ lives . . . .”371 Unfortunately, without well-considered responses 
to the legal and ethical implications of open data, the new trend may 
generate more harm than good. However, with careful data stewardship, 






 369. See supra Part IV. 
 370. O’Connor, supra note 234, at 481. 
 371. Exec. Order No. 13,642, supra note 1. 
